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ARMS INSPECTION
Since 1945 hostile gnat p w a r have been engaged in a minuet
over disarmament-advancing and retreating but never meeting.
Central to their division has been the issue of inspection-on one
side, "no more control than there is disarmament"; on the other,
"no more disarmament than there is control." Slogans in turn
have led tu ovdrnplifiation. Inspection is this or that, good or
bad, necessary or unnecessary.
The p r e n t article brings together for the first time the scattered thoughts of scholars and experts on this complex and littleunderstood issue. It probes beneath the surface to explore such
questions as: the functions of inspection, the relationship of
various types of inspection to the objects being inspected, and
the obsdescence of inspection arrangements under the impact
of technological change.
Inspection, the author points out, serves multiple purposes.
It is a means of detecting violations of an agreement, thus giving
the victim an opportunity to seek redress. The &reat of detettion
and of consequent reprisals serves to deter violators. If adequately devised, inspection can provide reassurance that 'U-is
well in the inspection system-" Optimally, it can foster a climate
af confidence that reduces tensions. A given inspection system
may serve all or only some of these purposes. How many it serves
is likely to be a compromise between conflicting objectives. The
goal of perfection, however desirable, is surely unobtainable. Are
the consequences that flow from no agreement more or less adverse than from an imperfect system? What are the political as
well as the security implications? Realistic appraisals involve a
complex balance sheet of gains and lases.

The nature of the inspettion rnd e w upoa what
ir bdng inspected: A good model in one instana might be a poaa
one in another. Nor a n the extent and depth of inspection be
necessarily corwlated with the gravity of the threat pooed by a
particular object.
+
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Even an inspection system that.
is devised is unlikely to remain so. There is a never ending r a a
between the perfecting of detection and antidetection devices.
At one time the balance may shift in one direction and at a
difftfl~en8time in the ahcr.FuMermore, the objscu e o v d by
pn inspmion q p e w n t m a y kmme more or lau a n d U, M*al
m r i t y . M a t d a b that hold the $rates2 war potential
todag m a y tomowau be rhpmeded by .Tachnologid develpp
manta not anticipated in a givm agxwemt
%bile such cumirtcratiohs seem rn militate! in favor of totzll
disarmament and inspection of all maja cxmfwrnenlt of m a m e ~ t s ,the author pints out that this mdusiaa is now unW h t h An k p d ~ not
n adequate to determine that there
rrm no hidden stockpiles or immmm~and thar materials wed
for pe~&tsI purpose^ were wi being diverted to weapons man*
ufnet~!would quire
invasion d rovezeignty at a h ~polntin&e~.Int&cwent~teafdi*NtU
appun unthinkable.
, w e s the ma.
bg chc hptxtion system, it may
paaq#; hem two .artmmer ,&hrmat rrrsumptiont have ken
thnt tbc:cp~aanmpst ;bea mm].tiUW w e bThe author, however,
I
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a d
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~hc
each
~ pcap?i.~~
kdlities rather than having
to tgrac orn,h+cr TBir in turn provides an elb
m a t olf reas-m
NOTS,
to the authop; is them amy
I W S O ~ to am~@e.
tbOI & e m i~vraihbnbkunder o reciprocal
r)atpp M aay lar @&vc :than unda n multilntaPl rystan.
The p&at =tide m
t
saiis r.usafulranindm that inspeaion
is a continuing problem- abnt. doa not. as is often
end

with signature to an agmment. The importance and complexity
of the subject justify in our view a treatment of greater length
and denrity than is usual for International Conciliation.

LAWRENCE S. FIN-TEIN,

Vice-President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prepared this article
during a year's leave of abanec at the Harvard University Centa
for International Affairs. The Endowment is grateful to the
Cater for the opportunity provided Mr. Finkelstein to pursue
his study of a subject of long-astasrdinginterest and for the facilities md cooperation from which he benefited. In addition to
the p r a m t article, Mr. Finkelstein has recently published studies
on "The United Nationr and Organizations for the Control of
Arrnunen~"in Zntrmatio~lOrganization, "Testing in the Atmosphere" in The Nnu Lcadrr, "Defence, Disarmament and
World Orda" in Behind tk H d l i n c s , published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and 'The Uses of Redprocsl Inspection" in a specid issue of Socdalw.
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INSPECTXUN
I+ wmy THI. ISSUE on which disagreement has
been most marlaxi in recent negotiations, bo* on the nuclear
t a t ban and on gcnaal and complete disarmament. British
Foreign Minister,
Home,recently said "bad and back
again I come to the question of verification as the point on
which the S U C C o~r hilur'e of our Conference will tum."l
The difficult ti& of devising formulas and methods for
inspection which govaments will consider both adequate
and acceptable has challenged g9vemment.s as well as others
concerned with restraining the
race and rirducing the
world's ominow burdux of armaxneqts. In the united States,
for example, the greatest single research investment in the
arms control field-with a byiget of $60,000,000 in one year
dm-has been the Deparwnt of Defense's Project vela
to examine detection methods to permit adequate supmirion of an agreemeot to cease nuclear tests. The task is so
ddiicult because it must concep itself not only with conflicting national objcdves with respect tq the inspectit$ arrange
menti themselves, but also with the intricate interplay of
iiispection, the arms limitations to be supervised, 'and the
texture of internatiofial relati~.mhipsas they evdlve under
projected clisammenft pxqpmr.
It is not merely that the goals of the great powm cox&$
today; the Western powers and t&e Compunist powers a%
trying to negotiate long-knn planj that accommodate the&
conflicting images of the future as well. The Soviet ~ n i &
p r ~ b e 4willingnm
;
tb atcept .csompleu connolr when there
t cgnp1cte h-,,,but rrfuPer io akep't inspection
I

.

unda a nuclear t a t ban agreement, which involves no actual
reduction of weapons. Th;&viet position waa recently stated
&IS: "Aftn the accomplishment of gene* and complete
dirarmament control will become unrestricfd and comprehensive bcmw then the States will no longer have any&ing
to hide fro&-.
g<*' p N Ussp!? f & q p is "no =re
control than &a+is diraimament." For the %Vestanpowen,

conapl, Put, progrdvelf,
an now 'be~bntkdIled.*~
HOW&r','k.hi~k Mr.
may be raid.flius to haw p t e d the
kknns, the m a g # ]iq fiat ?&a ~risumrmted:+e can-
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swit differepce o v a the

that ' ad ' amoud of "crmba1 manlpulatidn
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?a, bti;dge fieni. S&
i t ia' no a c c i e t that &ro\i@~ut
theb t * & 'hirto~i#
4fhnh+hi&i heetiitions the partfa
brire :6ttg'$hi~ed
pbphd ta icMxat'c ijbskions ~ t e 6 0 ~ 8 1 y
&i$i'
bbp' @fie 0ths'$id+,' ~ ~ t f t'ti 8d~ ~ etmking
by
Q Q ~ G ~ & B
PgssibZi. W'ilC
&it', &h'& '$ten as evi&ence&kt t6.i
#eiat $&k &b'e bi& '&@cidtis in their approach to the
negotiations, quite the c n&hy T& be true. h ma signify
#q-gi~it;on6~ ,&;it
p&, ~O&WC!T the,form o ape
ii& m i l -hi%c
h
m
a3'&Wani. hrndamhtal oppiriod
of in&bs
,ma&'i&&lsit&i'
ieib1e.4
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lit& profit in the Lind of.analysis that dapwmtvr how
e l y the parties' positions approximate each other on some
rmttersD6because invariably the key differences are revealed
in the language that remains unreconciled, or in what is not
a i d What has been true of the disarmament negotiations
in general has been
of the inspection issue in paqicular.
This i s not to say that th& essential difference cannot be
resolved; only that they have not been and that resolution
b not in sight.
These differences have dominated the postwar negotiations from the beginning. The first Western proposal with
regard to inspection, the Baruch Plan, called for international
"managerial c o n d ar ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security."7 As Bernard
Baruch made clear, the purpose of such "managerial control
or ownership" was to ensure agaiwt violation of the basic
prohibition on "possession or use of an atomic bomb" or of
the other proposed prohibitions. For the United States, the
effective institution of an adequate control system was a prerequisite to relinquishment of its atomic weapons and facilities? Even earlier than the Bamch Plan, in November 1945,
the heads of government of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada--the three states that had collaborated in producing the atom bomb-issued a -joint statement
urging the creation of a United Nations Commission to
make recommendations mi, inter aliu, "efftxtive safeguards by
way of inspMion and other means to protect complying
states against the h;llards of violations and evasions."@Subse-

ate

d,

6*,
for example, Philip E. acob, "The Disarmament Consensus," International Organircrtia, Vd.
No. 2 (Spring 1960). pp. 233-260.
6% Joseph Nogee, 'The Di b w y of Disamament,' International Concil#atm, No. 526 (Jnnwrg ¶&),pp. 279-289. Jama J. Wadsworth has also
graphically d&bed how apparent amveqpce of positions conceals differences. See The Price of Peace (New York Pmcgeq 191i2), pp. 88-92.
7 "United States Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy:
Staterpent of United States Representative (Baruch) to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, une 14, 19eg." in U.S. !Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, D k m a m e n t an Sectsrity; 4 Collection of Documents, 1919-1955
(Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 191.
8 Zbid., p. 192,
9 Zbid., p. 81.
i

d
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suekt unanimous adoptiob of thh language by the united
Nations General Assembly1* tempwarily disguised, but did
not rehove, thi basic disagreement between this pition and
-Q*
that of the Soviet Union.
h e Soviet emphasis was also established early. The soda
plan oh atomic energy, introduced in the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, called far renunciation of the we of atomic weapons, prohibition of production and storing of weapons based on atomic energy, and
dejtruction of all stocks of atomic weapons within three
months of the treaty's entry into force. Within six months
thereafter, according to the Soviet plan, the prties were to
pass legislation providing penalties for violations." In subsequent elaborations of this plan it was made clear that the
Soviet Union would accept controls only after the rrrohibitions had entered into effect.
Changing technology and tbe evolution of the negotiations
themselves have altered,the positions of the partia in many
fundamental ways. T h e United States, for example, has-long
skce abandoned the Baruch p r o p a b for ownenhip or managerial control of atomic facilities. And the Soviet Union
h a come a conddaable wly in appearing to a r k n o w 1 ~ c
the Western, and for many years now9 the United Nations
majority's, insistence on e,ffective inspection and control as
P condition £or a r m s reduction. But the flavor of the original
p i t i o n s persists. To this day the West stresses the inspection
arranpeqw and the Soviet U n i o ~Lrnphaaizcr the kin& of
prohibitions to be instituted.
The issum are real: tbe natiorial iaterests .of the main
negotiating states conflict on many questions affecting inpeaion. The disagreements over inspection are an integral
part of wider and deeper disagreements over disarmament
lO"J3stablishment uf a Commission on Atomic Energy: Resolution .of the
United Nations General Assembly, January 24, 1!346," US. Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, Review of the United Nations Chertm:
A CoClccrim of Documents (Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 427128.
alPor a description of the Soviet Ian, see B a n h u B ~ Bechhoek,
.
Pmtwar Negatiationr for rlrw Coatrd &a&bg~n: Bmkings, 1961), pp. 4446.
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d ,it&relation to natkgP1 recmirg, and over the ?placeof
diwipnarnent n @ a h in relation to national ends.
Xn a rapidly evdm t c g i e and political cnviranmmt,
the competition of naf&mI interam has generated conflicting proposals & to rsho b i d give up wh&t and $0 whgt
mder. Both
have $oughtto direct the negotiations along
paths .most congenial to their paptidar strategic nlvds and
abilities. Nor h it surprising that this should be 8o; the nee&
of countries differently situated ore different. Besides, for
any I g o v m e n t (although .mow for some than for ohen)
-&g
internal agreement on a n ~ i a t h initiative
g
lpmt
k a difticult political maneuvkr. To obtain agreement b n i
irm~tattd-cia
md faatbnsnammg those who wirh ta
aqpdate anil &me w b wopld ptefer
to, may well re
q&
dmnmtich a
t,if tbe proposed initiative h e
adopted, the country would be better off in relation to its
potential advemaia tbnh if
&gotiat.i,m rooL piace!
international agrettmats cam tk rrndred whidi do alrot
~nn&@winv01~ec o r n m e . The fact that very little real
iaterntfimai mdiq has ocewrrec.$ in.the p t w a i d$immwithat the pattia have, until not0
nrrnt Z W @ . ~ ~ E ~m
Q~
regarded their in
pitions Y king too far apm
to make ~ t l b l agreegarnu
e
possible; And in &e a b n a
of ~grmnenton what'pnnr the7 hiwe wan& to -redmeor
' d i a ~ t cthe
, great powem have not brm armder gnat pre4
$&re.t o t aeek to compromise their differences over inq&ction.
'&'+hilip
,NdCEBaker, for example, points odt thit ia 1952, and
fran 1954 to' 1937, the disagreements were ahat ''subtanzive rnetuum cjf artnameat redu~tion,"~
ra&er lhan abotft
irtsper:rion -nganmm+. Bemhard Bedrhoefer suggests that
theSoviet Union h a exploited differences over what is to
k regulated in or&r to avoid confronting the basic dilemma$ (dealt with in succeeding paragraphs) that inspection
:

,p. 530. Witness
Soviet
Eighteen-Natio? Conkrena:
the antent a£ ~ c n t

"

pwa for tbat mntry." He points mt that when th nqpEiadons got down to de:tSed maminatim of spec+& s t & .
-measures to reduce the hazards of surprise aurcL andfithe
nuclear tat ban-the inspection issue b-e
unavoidable
md viprous dkgrgxrnent soon developed.
The revase p i b i l i t y exists, too. Govemmmts unwilling
to pt down to miour negotiation over what to regulate,
because for one thing such negotiation might be revealing of
their ttut stnktqgic concerns, may prefer to disagree on thc
relatively abstract isrue of inspeaion. It should not be too
milrpabing if, when aH the documents have been published.
h
out that-,&& United States and the Soviet Union
ehW at vslrhus point, during the past decade to focus their
mutt& dbagmemts on ilapeaion. bemuse they were unwilling or dot id a poaition to bar*
Pkwt whU
to be
.conwdled.
The k t of inrpectian.h;m2 D been a convenient vehicle
fixthe Boviet Union. Because inspection is a highly technical
question, difficult to explain to a world public weary of
armaments, because to explain it requires more space than
is available in the normal nswspaper column, the public's
tendency to oversimplify coanplex issua, is more than-usually
evident. Thus, the Sovia Union has been able in the past
to make great pampap& &apitll,out of the more dramtic,
t&
"ban the bomb" approach. Its verbal ,\
acceptance sf the. nmwity far a . 'control, its frequent i
wrtian h recent yean that it wants. inspection and w i l l
accept whatever contr~ls.the Western powers wish when j
there is g e d . and brnp1cte dkmnamnt." have tended 1
M DoailEd G. Bi.emak, ed; hinr Conhal, Disarmament, and Nationd ScI

>r (,

-

-

mti? (NW YW? B w B 1 ~ 1 ) . 2a-m4.
34 orelpa Minuter h d k i . ~rome;tb recently told the Eighteen-Hation
.Confaenm in Geneva &at: "%he SoUtct Unian wishes to have the mwmary
gu;iraptees that fie e 3 h m a m e ~obligations that have been agreed upon
will be rdiEtly arried out mrl r3at there are no loopholes which will permit
the clandestine production of a wive armaments once the process of
ml and aomplcte d-tyw
beyn. Our munag does not i n t c n E i
take an ne-at hlawatBn. .;'Nar do we expect others to taLE us at oar
word.
$avtet Unicm b r firm advacate of r a i a maad oret diurmament." ENDC/PVZ# 15 Mar. 1962, p. 11.
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to dominate the reality that their general assertions do not
lead to adequate agreements on the esential, if less dramatic,
detailsbl6It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Soviet
Union, for at least much of the tirne, seems to have been
interested more in employing the negotiations as a means of
wakening the military and political position of the West
than as a route to a viable disarmament system. James J.
Wadsworth has accused the Soviet Union of employing arms
control negotiations as "part of a grand strategy aimed at the
eventual total defeat of &e other side.""
Thus, central though the inspection question may be, it
i s misleading to view it as an issue separable from the larger
context of agreeinent or disagreement in the disarmament
negotiations.
Inspection is a prickly question in another way. One of
the chief difficulties of disarmament i s that, if there is to
be much progress*there will have to be substantial invasions
of nationaI sovereignty and secrecy for purposes of inspection
and verification. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the
point succinctly when he told the Eighteen-Nation Conference in Geneva: "Secrecy and disarmament are fundamentally incompatible."17 Yet it is precisely this kind of invasion
of their sovereignty that Soviet negotiators have, from the
outset, sought to prevent. Soviet strategic capabilities depend
far more on secrecy than d o those of the Western countries. Moreover, the walls of secrecy that have been erected in Corn- '
munist countria are essential to the existing governmental
systems of the Communist world. T o the Soviet Union, then.
Western insistence that international control agencies must

-

rig.

~ ~ W a d k o r t hop.
, dt.,
41. See also Hemy Udnger*s analysis of the
tge tat
r at negotiatimg
d
~
a -itltionopy
Note. in ihe eontart
ban issue, in "Nudear Testing and the P r o b b of Peace," F m i p AifM'rs,
Vol. 37, No. 1 October 1958). Another, earlier Analysis of Soviet negotiating
tactics in this
is FWCP; ~ a b o r n ~
"N~ ~ ,tiating on ~ t o m i c~ncrgg,
1946-1947; in l l l y m d oslnt and Jo7ph l l o b n a m , odr. Negotiating
with the Russia= Baton: World Ptrrae oaurdadan* 1S1).
17ENDcpv.Io, m.1 9 e p. 9.
~

held
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pmetqaq tpw walk af m c y
K ~ W e f f ~undamine the ,Communist system' itself. The achievm~ns;of r
'disumed world, with i&concornitapt .full-blownsymm qf ip.
termtional inspection and control, would mqt prohhlg;
#rastically the conditions of governmew @'the Communbt
world.18 The Soviet Union is thus asked, Eor the sab;Fed disarmament, to acquiesce in the trans@vxda~;~
of its c m ~
bystem; it should therefore not be surprising tbat the .SO*
$Union does not hasten to reach agreement on ~ p e c t b
nts. Yet, it is difficult to disagree w$rh Seaetay
open world is an essential condition ,of,t$p.c, ,lrjnd
ament both the USSR and the Waitpowers
a n t This dilemma, more than any other, supports
ion of those who believe that inspection is the
key issue in disarmament. It also supports the belief of those
skeptics who doubt that major progress toward disarmament
will be easily or soon attained.
'
Secrecy i s not a problem confined to the Communist states.
. ,,K ,?&
7
:
ere are other totalitarian societies for which access for the
. :. urpose of inspection would be no less disquieting. It is by
o means certain that even an "open society" like the United
lStates could easily accept inspection that might compromise
$ndustrial and commercial secrets. The effort in recent yeam
o obtain international acceptance of the safeguards stan&
< t ds
r of the International Atomic Energy Agency suggest$
$*at other nations, too, are reluctant to permit incursions oh
Yheir sovereignty.
How can the need for inspeaion arrangemmts adequate
to generate confidence be reconciled with the reluctance of
the Communist nations, perhaps others as well, to permit
intrusions into their domestic systems? And further, how can
the ultimate requirement for an open workl be reconciled
, with d
osed governmental systems? If disamameat depends
b n resolving the absolute opposition of ultimately conflicting
plecessities, there can be no disarmament.

;"'#
t

.k

a

18See H d q Bull: "IR the Soviet Union, such inspectors could scarcev
fulfill their functions without undcrminin the whole character of Soviet
mdety.'' Thc Control of thc Arms Roac (EBmYo& Pr-,
1964, p. 101.

EV& the Sodkt Ohion has consistently recognized that
£ar:rding w e n t measurer inescapably imply farreaching inspectiop ;'@d'control aimagements. This means
that, if the end df ihe diPhmament road is to be reached,
there must be xkvcdutfb*
prerequisite changek-changes
tbat substitute the will io cooperate for today's pattern of
international d c t and produce in the Communist world
and elsewhere the condidom that make full inspection either
acceptable or no longer necessary. No one can predict that
such revolutionary changes will take place. The disarmament
problem is thus m identify and undertake those initial measura that will start the world on the disarmament path,
provide adequate grounds for confidence on the part of
suspicious governments, and avoid confrontation of those
ultimate bus that cpnnot bt solved under today's conditions. In this wag the paglege of time and the developing
aperience of arms limitatiow might lead to the necessary
transformations.
This is no ordinpry challenge. Well developed inspection
arrangements, both intensive and extensive, that might p m
vide the requisite confidence cannot, in all probability, be
negotiated in the near future. Thw the key to progress in
reducing a m may well be the ability of goverriments to
devise, a d their willingness to accept, inspection systems
with a high tolerance of emor. One way to etate the irsue k
to ask whether governments will m should a w p t a large
meah net, daigaed to catch only large violations that wou1d
ovaurn strat*
bdma and endanger peace and national
-Ti:ty;
or whether a fimr net, to catch d l or almost all
breakdowns of perkmunee, is essemtial.xDThe limitation of
arrnamena poses the sharp issue whether maximum inspection -ngenrents
are netded bl. whether minimum arrangen~enacan be accepted. Addresing this crucial question
=quires examination of the functions, limits, and methods

of iaqqxtion. W e ttae h & n of the d p * i s
gminder 9£ thir m a n w p t will rest on the
as they &act the great h e r s * espid1y
and the. Unit&
the analysis win be in considerabIe
meamre ap.pWle;to other countries ae Gel.
b
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The Functions and Setting of Inspecfion
IN THE NARROWEST SENSE, the purpose of inspection is to
supply information about the observance of obligatiom to
regulate armaments. More precisely, since governments ordinarily obtain a great deal of information through various
open and clandesthe &wfwls, inspection serves to supple
ment the infomation frum*thesesources and to enhance &e
reliability of what may already be known. Information derived through inspection also 'provides public evidence about
performance of obligations under systems to regulate a m .
To leave the matter here, however, i s to leave unanswered
all the significant questions about the role of inspection iq
the complex process of reducing thg threat of national armaments in ways that do not i e i r national security, or increase the risk of war. These questions lead to an exploration
of the interplay between what is being regulated (conventiopal forces, nuclear weapons, delivery systems, .military
dispositions) ,the strategic environment that results from the
regulation (relative stability or relative instability) ,and the
measures available t~ s ~ m
that a c victims of vialatiolo
(reciprocal vialation, other national military or political
responses, abrogation of
agreement, community WCtions. or enfacement masures).
Before -mining
these facets :of the problem, hawever,
some preliminary observations are in order. First, inspection
arrangements are predicated on the assumption that agreement on an arms limitation does not necessarily substitute
harmony and mutual tmst for the existing pattern of international relatiomhiw. It is m m e d that even hostile nations

i

intaan in redudng the rirlrs and the
brtrde- of unbricJUed arrrm mce. fmpection, in the ward9 of I
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tberebfe, has a sta : 113 satisfying the otner parties that it
io ~ y i n gout its obligations. And since demonstrating
compliance is an act in which each party should be more
expert than any outside agency can hope to &, an inspectias
system should allow. for opportunities f@r the parties to
provide evidence of coraplhce so that all the burden a£

proving violatian is not placed on the system.
The impormm of infowltion to show that the system is
operating-as it should is evident. Once an inspection system
bas been set up, its continued smooth performance is pres ~ l m dto be an essential. condition of national confidence
that there is no violation of the obligations being supervised
and ;that future violations will be discovered. Even if there is
no direat evidence of violation. the interruption of important
flaws of infarmation will create doubt as 6 whether the part i e arc living up to their obligation^.^
4 1 three of these functions may be necessary to the sncceshl working of any arrangement to regulate arm. Clearly,
the second--detection of violations-becomes most relevant
to M arrahgement that is not working successfully. Nevertheless, for the second function to be performed well will ordinarily require that the inspection system have the capacity to
perform well the other two functions. The assumption seems '
justified that variables other than the differences among these
three functions will in most cases determine the nature and 1
the severity of the demands made on inspection systemsl
What are those variables? They are the three alluded to
earlier:' (1) what is being regulated; (2) the resulting stra- 1
tegk enviqopment; and (3) measures in response to violations., '1
1
4

4I

~Tcftnand
l Hadperin identified somewhat differently what they tamed
UUJNX~~GBEX
I) to insure detection of non-complipaa; 2)
to deter evasion; or ) to warantee security. This scheme omits the "reassuransew kactolr lrrd takcd rather a minimum view of what should be
demanded of inspection. See Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin,
"Policy Considera'tions of a Nuclear-Test Ban," in Bretman, q.M't, pp.
234-266.
a But see Lincoln P. Bloomfield's su stion that reassurance may make
severe demands of inspection in T h e PoKcs of A m C a t r o l : Troikn, Veto,
and International Znsti
p. Stud Memorandum
No. 3 (Washingtan: Ins
O n lhl),pp. 1811.
See p. 15.
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T o inspect the elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles
involves different techniques and carries a heavier freight
of consequence than to inspect an agreement to limit conventional forces to aisting levels.
T h e kinds of arms regulations that might call for inspection are almost infinitely various. Some measures would
involve no disarmament at all-for example, agreements to
stabilize budgets, personnel, or weapons at existing levels, or
to refrain from orbiting weapons of mass destruction in outspace, or to cease testing nudear weapons, or to refrain from
certain types of research. T h e agreement not to militarize
Antarctica was such a regulation. Agreements regarding the
deployment of military farces would fall into this category,
as would arrangemena to safeguard against surprise attack
by providing for the exchange of information or for stationing of moniton or control posts at strategic installations.
Another type of anns arrangement might provide for the
reduction, but not dimination, of existing armaments or
categoria of amzunents by fixed amounts or n u m m by
mias or percentages, by destructive capabilities, or to fixed
levelS. The latest United States p r o p o d for general and
complete dismtnament advocate this approach, mvering all
weapons and particular types." Still another type would call
far the immediate complete elimination of all weapons or
forces of certain k i d , a of all kinds. All the types of upanpc~l2rsmentimed rn examples, and many more, have
aaual17 figured in pmpumls advanced at one time or another
in the postwar search for acceptable measures of disarmament.
Inspection metho& muat be r a p *
to the needs posed
by the objects being contfolled; the range of possible techniques i s great. Technologid monitoring, employing iastrumentation such a seismmphs and radar, is one technique.
It Is relevant to such Ijrnitations as a nuclear test ban and
regulation of space vehicles. Aerial and space surveillance,
wing advanced photographic techn01ogy, can be useful in

uni& ati ions Dor DC/POS, 5 Jlule 1962
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&eckiwfor &dnpSe; on elimination or geographic restrktion d missile emplacements and prohibition of production
of designated major weapons systern.
In many ,ways human obsemdon is the best' means of
inspection. On-the-spot inspection can
the for& of perw e n t control posts ra regular or ad hoc inspection visits.
It is pertinent, either as a pripary or supporting inspection
means, to almost all limitations. R~ecor&examination, either
of ficcal recar& or of production and material controlr. .h
relevaat to productba restraints and budgetary limits, among:
others. Persoad records inspectian may also be relevant:to
limitations on military manpower or-by keeping tabs on
individuak with key h c t i ~ a and
s special s k i l k o n weap
o m research, devt$opment. and production. Socalled ''pp
chol~@cal"op b a n inspection is designed to elicit infixmation frcm the popul+tibs of the country being inspected
and is relevant to all types of restraintsa=
It is not possible, by pawing examples of kinds of
limitations and of inspection techniqw or even by e ~ a n r i n ing complete Invenmrics of both, toreach any $wimu f&e
qan.cPusiom as to which categories pose gsreata diflicultierr of
inspection or pr.-t
greater ridu to the participanu. These
b,mr8bplepmgrasion of diflEiculty or significance from
rwai.nu that do 'not actually reducs arms9 through tihose
taat .call fw partial red~ctbm,to total reductions. It may be
more difkuit tedanieally aad - poditicidly. for example, to
inspectynn agreement,not to orbit vehicles of mam decltruct
tion in space than an a g e m e a t EJ elkinate all mval -Is
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In this matrix the difficulty of inspection refers only to the
technical problems.
Obviously, the place to look for worbble first measures
is not in the upper right-hand corner. Measures in the lower
left-hand corner may be worthwhile, particularly if they have
the potential of generating mutual confidence. But they are
unlikely to be important enough or to pose sufficiently difficult tests for the inspection machinery to generate much
movement toward larger, more important measures of arms
reduction.
This matrix may be more useful in suggesting places not
to begin than in giving positive guidance. While it is apparent that one should be searching for measures that lie in
the area demarcated by the broken line, the broad descrip
tions of the matrix do not give enough qualitative definition
to be very helpful in pinpointing what is usefully achievable.
Each measure in the appropriate area of the matrix needs
to be individually examined to assess what risks it poses and
what difficulties of inspection it presents. Particular care
must be taken to avoid assessments that are too static. Both
the elements of risk and difficulty of inspection can change
rapidly.
The explosive growth of technology and the impact of major
investments in research may very speedily alter the problem
of inspection. This applies to the development of weapons,
to the techniques of evasion, and to the capabilities of inspection apparatus. Missiles, for instance, were not vulnerable to
previously existing capabilities for detecting approaching
aircraft. Nuclear submarines are invulnerable to old techniques for submarine detection. Evasion techniques are a
constant subject of military concern because the successful
conduct of war requires an ability to deceive the enemy and
evade his efforts to.identify and intercept your forces. The
layman obviously can know few of the details. Yet, he can
be sure that efforts are constantly being made to improve
the capacities of aircraft, missiles, submarines, and other m e
bile instruments of war to evade detection. Camouflage to
conceal ground installations from enemy aerial surveillance

nd to hide infantrymen from snipers is a matter of continuing interest to military services. Not all military metho&
of evasion are relevant to inspection of arms control agreements, but, obviously, many are. On the other side of the
scale are efforts to improve detection techniques. The Ballistic Missiles Early Warning System (BMEWS) was a ree to the problem of detecting approaching missiles.
oject Vela was an attempt to improve techniques for deting nuclear tests. It also performed another function-to
creaseunderstanding of the problem without reference to
vancing technology. T o understand more, however, does
not necessarily make inspection easier; increased understanding after the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 made
inspection of the proposed nuclear test ban appear more
U Sbe
~ ~made
,
as
difficult. No over-all prediction, O ~ V ~ Ocan
to whether inspection is likely, in general, to become easier
or more difficult. All that is certain is that the problem will
It is often stated, but deserves reiteration here, that no
inspection arrangement can be foolproof, although the fact
that certainty cannot be achieved is dearly no reason to
eschew efforts to control arms. The problem is to devise
inspection systems that reduce the probabilities of successful
evasion to tolerable levels. Some calculations of probability
can be worked out mathematically or statistically; others
represent no more than informed guesses. Since the attempts
at statistical precision always rest on postulated assumptions
as to the conditions under which inspection will go forward
-some of them, to be sure, descriptive of existing or predictable reality, but others speculating about unpredictable developments-they too rest ultimately on the best guesses of
the analysts.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that in some cases no
inspection arrangements can even reduce the uncertainties
to acceptable levels. What is "acceptable," of course, is not
an absolute question. It depends on political circumstances,
the general climate of confidence, the relationship of the
particular measures to other existing or contemplated arms

Amorher mponse is to devise arms limitations that d
facing this dilemma. The elimination of nuclear stockpile&
is obviously now beyond the realm of achievement, sMf tb
postpone the rkks attendant upon making the attempt is not
ably prudent; it is probably a necessary condition of progress.
For this type of risk to become acceptable, many changes will.
have to have occurred in the v e n t environment--amelia
ration of political conflict and a confidence-inspiring history
of successful arms limitation are among the necessary ingrc
dients. Changes of this order will require the passage of considerable time, and, if they are possible at all, will be achieved
only by postponing high-risk measures until late stages of the
progression t m r d general and complete disarxiament

-emen@
liu in'the rimtiom that obtain after the ar~rangtmmtsb?v;e4xeh implemented. Many ingredients arc
inv01werd;a21 uf &em dif.Iiieult to merw with confidence. There
is the fw&& o~33I;lhionthat governments are asked, ba
doFe rtqgre'ernentsuc &teedinto, to anticipate how they will
upmate ia a future (hat a n be at best but
perceived.
T h e ~ ~ t j o roif9the paties are imponant. Is it, to state
tlae mat& in
tenns, their purpose to explorit a p namt to d u c e the ~ish
of war, cut down armaments costs,
i n a e a ,~m a 1 coaMepce, stabilize international r e l a b
<&ips, aMl tmidd the p ~ t l i r i t a
far more bqeaching ~mcac
met of c i & a m a ~ 3 ' Q ra&aMwise,
b
is an arms zagrmat.
&Am
Jams Wadsw~rth'st e m already
~
quoted in
a di@er&t &at= 'f*
of a :gtand strategy aimed at the
eventmf totd defeat.of"& d ~ e +side"?
r
Will sane.or a11 of
tbe pvties reek M, t d ~ e
g d h t a * of the unavoi&bik lacunae
m obacuritirs m igrketncntd in mder to gain h n 2 a g e s aver
the other participants? Or will t b k ~
e p t restraints desi@d
tr, buiM m&de'~:e d stability? What is the political settibag3 k thtre important, unresolved issues? What are the
p j d ~ ~cdndtti~ ~ d :inwhich the agr'eemimts opaaee?

Doer one party or do all believe that arms reductions a d the
envimnment that r a u h from them will hasten .the achieve
ment of national goah? L &ere mutual suspicion leading to
friction and constant. p a w e agzimt the'apparatus of the
system? Or is there belief that the agreements mark a departure with a better future in store? What are the amsequences
of fnuaatMn of thOcK h o p ? One way to summatbe ruch
qugstionr ir to a& whether ,the parties believe the agreements
will lead to o condition of p e t e r or lesser security. And in
this amemmat the ten-1 consideration is the ~trategicrelado~lstripsthPt will result from the agreements.
To be@
with, $ovemmentc hevitably view most of the
quesaiom r a i d abme p e s s ~ s : i d l y or
, at least cowxvatively; they are unable to entrust the future of the nations
for which they have responsibility to agreements based on
ex''tations that mutual confidence, good feeling, and reliable perf-ce
of obligatioIis will prevail. Agreements
will have obscurities or lacunae and it is only prudent to
amune that responsible authorities will tesponsibly seeL to
convert them to national advantage or, at the very least, to
avoid national disadvantage, which wsually leads to the same
result To take just one hypothetical but hirly obvious
example, can it be assumed that defense ministries will not
seek t~ build bigger, faster, newer weapons of a given cato
gory when an agreement has been reached to limit the
number permitted? Nor are such efforts mxwarily an evideace of hostility toward the other parties to the agreement.
Ddcnre minirmos behaw the q e way when the restraw
are imposed by sister k c e miniraies or by gooemmeat
c o m ~ I 1 e r s It
. has to be taken for granted-at least in the
car17 stages of the dimmarnent process-that, in shaping
their military capabilities, pwticipants in acontrol arrangapea~will try to hhion the most effective defensa
withintthe ratmints established, even if they do not try to
bend, evade, or break those restraints.
Mmmvet, as has already been made clear, there is no
&.son to agume that mutual confidence will prevail at &e
moment of decision on an awr agreemeat. Politid temsim
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18 April '1962 proposals, has
advocated a 30 per a n t acrors-the-boardcut in b t h saraeSr;c
delivery systems and other weapons in the first stagr. T b e

United States contends that a p e m m t a g e reductionsBis the
ma&equitable way to cope with the problem (since the partia will begin reductiom froln merent levelr of capacity awl
with different strategic rtqwirements)-in U t it will preserve
existing =ins of farce at lower uans levels. Moreover, the
, amoa4he-bard a p p o d , involving cuts both in nuciear and
conventional capbi&ria,:& deigned to even out whatever
diudvan~a
my p g ~ ~y ymffer
, as a result of reductions
in OW sphere. Ia
m~
.*& United S&S
would be
to give up
>aIho]kuwnudear strength on thc
asrwq&ion t h ; ~itiwo& .begio with an advantage over the
Soviet!Uoioa in tbjr spbqse; at the same time, the Soviet
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w
at the -t.
This brief sketch barely begins
to hint at thp c&tplexity of the United states plan, which
pbo px~ppsesmquura in other spheres, among them t e w
qs)a of production of nuclear weapdns matmiah and reduction <of ~teckpileq,*measures against surprise attack, and
first-stage reduction of military personqel to 2.1 million ea&
f&
USSR and,the United Stat=?
.
.,2LBtt.le
of this plan has met with Soviet favor. The USSR
Boc ptopwgl, instead* a
calling in the k t s m e
@.compke .elbination of all means of duclear delivery;Y
dkaumeling .of.
&?reignmilitary baser and withdrawal of forfrom
dien temx-yr Feduction of armed forca
e*.
reduction of conventiq.d
% fixed. 1em4(1,900,000 each),
amamentl by SO per cent,and of armaments production and
m i l i ~ r y.apnditures
:
"propprti~nately"to the other reduo
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tions. The Soviet proposals provide, with respect to each
measure of reduction, that inspectors of the proposed
International Disarmament organization are to "verify implementation" of the specified measures.
For the purpose of this paper, the key aspect of the United
States plan may be that the United States envisages a measured pace toward complete disarmament. Although a 30 per
cent cut in United States nuclear delivery capability and
conve~tionalarmaments is a major slice, 70 per cent would
remain at the end of the three-year first stage. Moreover,
even the 30 per cent reduction would take place in annual
bites of 10 per cent each. In any one of the three years, each
country would risk a disadvantage of less than 10 per cent
if the other should fail to fulfill its obligations. That risk
should be tolerable to both sides. The United States plan
means that the government believes that United States security would not be dangerously threatened by a breakdown of
the agreement at any point during the three-year progression
to the second stage. The proposals, by and large, seem designed to create a relatively stable first-stage situation-and
one relatively invulnerable to levels of violation likely to
rupture the agreement.
some of the specific measures proposed could be inspected
relatively easily if the problem is simply to provide assurance
that proportional reductions on the -basis of declakd levels
actually occur. For example, the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles could take plade in central locations and be
observed by the inspectors. T h e same applies to conventional
armaments. ow ever, to ensure that production of nuclear
weapons material has ended obviously requires quite an
extensive and intensive inspection operation, because nuclear
facilities would have to be inspected to make certain that
sudiproduction has been stopped and that it stays stopped.
The same is true of the conversion of nuclear materials to
peaceful uses. Reduction of conventional forces to fixed levels
involves more than counting the force reductions; it clearly,
in its own terms, so to speak, requires counting the remaining forces to make sure they do not exceed the limit. And a
-
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second thought about the seemingly slrnple rmsures of
ins~ectionreveals the corn~lexitvbeneath the surface. If
reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons are to take
place by percentage, do not the over-all totals, on which the
percentage reductions are to be based, need to be reliably
confirmed to ensure that the parties make true declarations
.
of the levels from which the reduction begins?
The elements of a perplexing dilemma are thus cl&rly
delineated. The relatively minor risks that would be involved
in the United States first-stage proposals suggest the possibil
ity of limiting the extent and penetration of the inspection
arrangements to ease the difficulties governments would face
in accepting them. More intensive inspection would be postponed until later stages when the extent of the reductions
would be more significant. Smaller violations would then
yield greater "payofEs" than would result from violations of
first-stage limitations. Under this approach, first-stage inspec
tion measures would be limited to those needed to ensurc
that major violations, that might threaten security and
stability, would not go undetected. It should be recognized
that the latter is a "minimal" approach, based on only one of
the relevant criteria. There is no doubt that, if the sole
standard by which inspection arrangements are to be evalu.
ated were the existence of relatively certain guarantees againsl
de-stabilizing violations, the task would be much eased. Dis.
armament, however, will be an intensely political process in
which the reassurance functions will have high significance
for both international and domestic audiences-the United
States Congress being but one. Some reassurance might be
provided by the comparison between information supplied
under negotiated inspection arrangements and other information that would presumably continue to flow outside the
more formal inspection channelsd2 High confidence in the
A

I
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82 The Soviet Union's uncertainty as to how much is furown of its military
a&rs might place it under some extra pressure to fulfill its obligations
under arms agreements. If we have fairly high confidence in information
available outside the inspection apparatus, Soviet behavior would be a good
indicator of intentions. However, there is bound to be a margin of doubt as
to the reliability of such information in the absence of a h l l y elaborated

performance, of the oblig7tions under the United States plan,
however# would neceaitate hirly artelwive irqedan armgemetlts.
On the whok, while it will surely be difficult to' reach
agreement on high assurance inspection arrangements, it
may also be dScwIt tb r e d agreement without them. Morc
over, topc~tponethe hues .until later stages is not to eliminate them. It is likely that some day declarations of exbting
force levels would 4wrn- to be verified if arms reduction
k to prx- to the low levels of high risk. At that time, also,
very rigorous Wption controls would probably be essential
with respect}to~y sd$@ of limitations if even the minimal
criterion i s & be met. b e would argue that the important
thing is to get the ppoass started in the hope that with
experience will comeco~&aceand with time, change that
will either case the appliution of progressively more rigorous
control8 or make t h c m ' a n n s q because of the growth in
international ~~nfi&mx.
O;tEIm#however, would maintain
that now is the time torget the disarmament process oE on
the right footing. Since rigorous. inspection will some day be
necessary, the argument goes, nations should &ow their commitment to the process by accepting immediately controls
&at will allow the development of high confidence; thereby
tewions and suspicion could be reduced sooner &d progress
toward the long-term goal of general and complete disumament could be aderatad. One reply to this wuld be that
g o v m e n t s may be appropriately' expected to clemunstrate
their good will by accepting the degree of inspection necessary to make ihe proposed measures of disarmament feasible.
and that to ask more of them is to seek to invade sovereignty
gratuitously or, as i s sometimes alleged, for disguised partisan
Pu=pobeSo
iarp~ctlanscheme aa8 we could rpever be ssm* for arpmple, that misleading
information was not be*
"fd"to the information sounxs. Brennan has
stid: "meextent of our jiaibmmdon
kavca mu& to be d & d .
The
infomaation is tenibl inamphe, often misleading, anit mmctimer, &wnwt t
a
w be d e s OF fn~gxtiogin A ~ control/
S
SumStutiy on
A r m C m $ ~ o l196Yf: C o f k W efa~r3W n : Anadcan A&y
& Artl
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1961), p. 249. ,

. ..

...

&g"to judge the we~ghtMat 8hould

be

strategic amidetatfi83ag1in the auessIILcnt
of inspection standards.-In other words, on the! one hand,
d a c is a risL that minimal i~pectianrequirements will
pose &cats U, nationnl m r i t y I to iateirnth~mlhummy,
and to peace. On tbr: a t h e l ~these
.
is the ria that
rigorous inrpcaionrctemm& wili pevent any agreement
at dl,
The United Stater.'po cads actually advocate a fairly
delicate hqbmce W e e n C att$&es of minimal and full
impectid
pEan atablissla the pl'inciptc ,ofe f f d v e
ker3bicati&n,Sluding q a i + s u ~ cthat
e *agreedlevels of amamezits and b i d fmtm were not dtceded,' and that "actid&
da lhited bt @&ibitdl by the Treaty were not being
conduad chhdednely." Hwever, it g t k s on to advocate
thd€ *inspecthaappaiatus should bc pqessively develop&
in a ~ b c with
e the principle "that the extent of inspection duriw any step or stage would be related to the amourit
of elisarmmint being u n d d e n and to the degree of risk
to rhe P d e s to the Treaty of possible violations." To mike
the balance, the plan suggests the p i b i l i t y ,of a: d e m e
for m p l e inspktion by zone. Urider mch'ascheme, all
arms 'reductions would be veriiDied btrt the extent of the
crnitoty completely inspected to ens*
tbav agned levels
were not weeded would be ~
~i n & d
t untii,p at
thetadof th:$ thM rtage of the thited State plan, "whai
all d ~ ~ C meaguia
n t had bcn completed, inspection
would, b& *n orte@ed to irlI pvtl of the mitory of

8

~ d '60 d 'Tray."

It Ba *c*
bcQ obwqd that iiwpection ir mart
&lly viewed' in .hW
o
n to thc rwpares avabbl
vihicll ye Sne victims of violation by a m
tbr parria De@me:&, af violation depends on the n
of the responses available and on the likelihood, that th
1

b2

will be employed. Jkisionx to react depend, in turn, on
tho efficacy of isrspcction in, filling the prerequisite need f ~ r
information. En m e y Bull's words: "The ipfomtion
gathered by int@igenci agencies or international inspectorates . . plays i part in a system of control only when it
reacheti the hands of &use with the power and will to act
upon it."= ,.
,
The dm,r~iqr,aftbc inspection tjystem's need for information dcpeo@,@ntwo interacting consideratiow. One is
the severity of the violation and the consequent risks attaching to appmpt(? wmtameasures. Thcsekd is the nature
of the s y e d r m p w , whether it i s a "self-help" systemz
or an organkai in&mational instrument for enfckcing the
a n n s limitazjiom.
"Punkhrnmt'' is a h neegardo as the purpose of measured
taken in repom to viahtiun* Actdlys it ir probably the
least important and least convincing of the reasom for such
meaura. ,Onehportqat reasonSit i s obvious,is detqrence;
&t
assurance &at appr~priawmeamerr can be taken that
will limit the advmtagc of nolation'is a means of reducing
the temptation to .violate. Another important reason is to
q b l c govemeatl to rqtify the imbalances, neutralize the
threats, and repair the gaps that 'violations.m a y create, A
high degree of assurance that such meaures will be available
in the event of ,vialation seems an ecsential condition of b y
important ,urnsagjreement coming into effect. - '
In genmls minor v&tithat.do not threaten
the parties, to m y @eatt e x t e n ~ a ufor minor respo~wa.
This i+sWQW.
&@w cesipnaes in themselves mag involve
great risk and we rhw unlikely to be undertaken lightly by
governments. In arms control, as in other spheres, the prim
up1e of condip pwm&thppars to,apply* HoweverS
ent mi= vEr[rMmmight generate pseaures for m?jar, perhaps hazardow, respamess less
'ofstrategic
rislu posed by the &olitioar themselves than because the
wcgrity of the @€aI.l
is iIrlp-t,

.

'

1

I
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Comaol," oQ. dt., p. I&.
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xA&ilB"bfe'rapu& kpqge frdre ohg mfnaa ttl &may
in rough cmehtim with the natutc aE thc OQ&T~%&~
p d by violadom. As lmg as 'nuclear capabiaitks continue
to exist, it might be a i d that available responses
begiiP *t
zero and appr6ach &&y.
The appropriate respo& to violation at the lower end
of the scale--pahaps the result of obscurity in the agrco
ment, administrative mdi; or even limited efforts to probe
the gmsibilw 'oEgetting ' i i i q irith minor e~icms-may,
in some wes, 'brta ~i'
orC the violhtiun, at least in public,
Cl%d&ne ~ p cob
s d &en be *Ikm to counter whatever
m g e tnay hatre ben done, perhaps supplemented by a
~ ~ ~ k s s &tko 'the' violatbz''ihat'hc has not gained an advantage.@ Negotiating compliance may also be approgriatkPu
sam&n&=an tlia.h i s of newly agreed understandings as
emeht s ~ ~ a nand
s bow iu requiremenu m a y
be' hlfi1led:rn
Vioht.9m - sat threaten to de-stabilize military balance
map d l 6Dr more extreme nepmes~It should be mted:
ineidddly, that the very £act that an aims agreemeht exis@
may infuse an*othawi~;ambiguousaction with a connotation of extreme t h ~ e a tRisponses
.~
ta such violations include
vi ton vidationtieither the' m e m e m e as the
d~Iator'sor some other meisme to retake balance or to
pmvikte defense w i n s t the con~lequt~es
of the original .
LD appmp&t&:doui~tern%~ure5
need vi01ate
some -7 fall oa&t the agreement's wope
dour

Ir

$"

1

donion of nuclear vehicles or intensify research and testing
in the fieId d anti-missile defense. Denunciation of the
agreement-or of all arms agreements-is another' avallabli
recourse, although a fairly extreme one, since it implies the
possibility of a nkewal af the arms race. Finally, military
action, including haclear war, cannot be ruled out as a
response to exaemiklp. pi"oqocative violations. 13eployoam&.
of nuelear dclirery vehides in apparent violation of aa"
agreement to redwethe risks of surprise attack, for examplep .
would force other ~OFWZ-S-to consider seriously whetha o#
not to launch a wpiivetnptivcmnuclear strike to forestali th#
nuclear attack. sbehn2ng1y threat&
by the violator.
The kinds-of' ftiekbeai sketdied in the preceding para
graph are designed tb ~edttcethe "payoff' to a violator
countering the military advaiteges his violation might othcr;
wtie generate? 3%wtsome of themealsoinvolve con~equence~
to the over-all te-ktim! ofrelatiom amdng the parties; tensions
might be heightked and the' risks of war increased. T h ,.;*&
same may bc s&idfor *$pan&s that involve denial of d i p l a #
matic, economic, or politid goals of the violator. Sanctions
of this kind can be exm=ted..in the direct diplomatic, eeonomic, and political relations of the parties wiih each other.
be exerted by the akion of permanent or
They can
ad hoc coditions or alliances; by efforts to mobilize a hue
and a). of international public opinion, through the i m t i m
tionaiized m g m e n t s of the arms control ap&tiorn,
or through the United Natioas,
,The implictxtions of this range of posible respoTlSeiii for
inspection ~eedkare not entirely apparent. It seems Jear
that, before g p v ~ c n responding-to
p
violations undertake
measures that th-1xa
~sry
a heavy freight of risk or

$"."

-

'&eke xnq be no way to redoe the
a ~t SILO~M
be IIMEKI, 'hmnrrr,
"payoff' i q some vioIsrthns. It would do the victims little good ts learn
reliably & i t one of &e' parties {had mcece&d in c1anWdnzly producfng
arid deploying enough- nudear £om& a
against mWks suffidentl
efkct,ive to over rn the klanae of deterrent p o w . On this point rc PauI
Y. Hammond. '%me. DMcultier of SeM-enbrcing Amu Agreement*" The
j a m 1 of Cmflict RcsoJutio~~
V& VI, M.2 (June 1962), p. 106. Maas- mond d d s with r possible e i e t viokha of a dircapgement irrgniclncnt
in Europe.
'

potential disadvantage, they will need to have unambiguous
evidence of violation; this implies a need for information
that is ample in quantity and high in reliability. However,
the key element here is that the information available to
governments be persuasive that the violatkn has occurred,
whetha the information comes through the established inspection apparatus ot via the other channels through which
information customarily flows to governments. Whether or
not the inspection arrangements demonstrate the existence
of a violation, a government convinced by its own evidence
that a serious violation has occurred will act in defense of
its interests. Such information may not be as reliable an
instrument of deterrence ur a high-quality inspection arrangement. However, the very £act that much ia unknown
abwt the information-collecting capacities of individual
governments may make it more difficult to devise techniques
of evasion that assure escape from detection. The limits of
an int-ernational system, on the other hand, will be known
and may thus help a potential evader to calculate his chances
of getting away with a v i o l a t i ~ n . ~ ~
With respect to very threatening violations, irispection
arrangements seem to serve a reinforcing function. They fi
in the gaps in government intelligence sources, provide
means of checking the reliability of information tha
wise available, and permit governments to avoid co
ing revetations of their own information sources. Probably,
inspection arrangements carnot be substituted for
me'ntal i ntell igence sources; governments will continue to

To do

90

W

t reveal too much about their intelligence

=On this polrrt, see Fred C. RIC, Altmaatfa A34yoaches to the Intat.
national Orgfltnbaticm af Dimmaamnt (Santa Monica, Galif.: The RAND
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MT. C. O'Sullivaa has explored some of the ways in which national in-

fornation 9pems and i n t e m a t h d inspections arrangemenu interact in
" N u b Tcst Ban, Detection Networks and National Decisions" (Lexington,
Mass.: Itek Laboratories. PO Feb. 1961, revised 9 May 1961). (Hectograph.)
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of basidly umramcled national sovereignty from the
.T-y
of meaningful supraatic)nal authority,"41The prc
requisite for the latter is a degree of internatiwal c
o
that will permit effective sanctbns to be applied by the lawabiding against thme who violate the law, whoever, they
may be.
Thusy the nudear test ban treaty i &t put f m m d on
18.April 1961 by .the United Kingdom and the United State
outlined an daborate cpstam of iaternittional inspection, but
did not provide .even foe cullactive.decisioms as to whethn
vbkd6m have ucamx& mu& I- far collective action in
have been identified.
r a p m e .to violations
The h&age of the most reant United Stat= plan for
@semi.nd cmpIete cibmnammt it^ obscure on these points.
But since, at the end of the pro*
second stageythe United
States ind the &iet union would retain.ST, per c a t of their
ariginkl nuclear systems and conve&ional weapomy the
United Natiom Pace Force proposed by the United States
wotlld have to be a strong one to be of military significance
with respect to either of these great powas. If the intemational community were able to solve the problems o£ creating, controlling, and using such a force, a degree of consensus
would &st, which practically by Minition would diminate
the problems of endorcement of arms agreements with which
this paper is concerndAorMduce them ab easily manageable
proportiom.
Therefwe, meaningful analysis of inspection arrangements
bns to ztdmhe that they will work h relation to a "self-helIj"
tptem.
"if dobe regpdns&' to vioiations were made by
alliances or 0 t h continuing
~
or tem'prary collective gr~up
in@, selk-help wouid itih be involved, albeit by groups of
like-minded sates. '
One important'coni=(luence of this state of affiirs i s *tb
in itti essentials, the Cnforcement of arms agreements is not
dependent ' ~ the
n crystallization of international consensus.
,

1

4X ~ a & nP. ~ l d e l d *A&
,
B-1
and World ~ ~ c r a t , World
* @
Politla, Vol. X N , NO.4 (July 1962). p. 641, .
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Such consensus may be important in various ways, such as
adding dimensions of political risk to the other risks incurred by a nation that violates an arms agreement. As has
been suggested above, consensus may be more important in
avoiding and rectifying minor transgressions than in dealing
with the major issues. Essentially, however, the operation
of worldwide arias control systems depends on the system'
ability to satisfy a few great powers that their national interests are being served by the web of obligations, institutions,
and functions growing out of the desire to limit armaments.
In establishing inspection arrangements and in operating
them, nothing should be allowed to obscure the central
principle that the primary audience for the information
developed by inspection systems is that small circle of governments on whose continued cooperation the survival of
major,arms conaol tiystenudepends. There are other audiences to be sure. Every effort should be made to meet the
heeds of other governments and of the world public as well.
But when, ar is inevitable, the two ordm of priority get
inreach other's way, the first should prevail. The primpurpose of international inspection arrangements !bto ensure the availability of an adequate flow of information,
unambiguous as p i b l e , to a selected number of governments which need to be mured that obligations u n d d e n
under arms ape&tntc are being Eulfifled, that ,the appanitus of inspection is functioning as it should, and that the
gcwanments will b o w it, shoultl either no longer be tme.
'OPkcyum, over the longer range, the unfolding possibility
of collective enforcement would. significantly alter this eo&-t
clusian. It might,-&a
be aecarr~rgto ctmtemplate a m & c men@ to employ inspection ru an-instrument of collective
ddsion-rnakitag.- Fa! present purposes, however, it daes not
wan necessary to venture onto that unexplored and distant
terrain.

-

r

Some Problems of Inspection

I

I

xi.,&bi.~n:~

THIS
CHAPTER WILL EXAMINE selected inspection problems
that have already arisen in acute form in the negotiations,
or which seem likely to be confronted in the future. They
demonstrate how complex are the considerations that bear
on choices between minimal and full inspection.
Detection and Identification

The nuclear test ban negotiations have shed light on an
issue that might increase in-importance if, as appears likely,
advanced military capabilities should be dispersed more
widely in the future. That issue is how, once a violation is
suspected as a result of the working of the inspection arrangements, the fact can be confirmed and responsibility assigned.
In short, inspection in some cases may involve both detection
and identification of violations. This problem arises particularly in cases where initial detection measures employ distant
technological,monitoring devices such as have been proposed
with respect to nuclear tests and limitations on activities
in space.
With respect to the nuclear test b
particular, Setretary of State Rusk pointed out:
Detection, however, is only half the story; in fact it is rather less
than half. The primary concern is to know exactly what has been
recorded or detected. For example, the signal received on a seismograph from an underground nuclear explosion looks like the
signals received on a seismograph from many types of earthquakes.
Signals which may come from a small nuclear detonation in the
atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In each case, the overwhelnjing diffi&lty confronting any contr
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a nuclear tat ban is haw tm M&emtiate m o g w i o m r e c ~ &
ingr or detected signahd'hanto t d l which is r natural p b man a d whicb & ,a.nwbq e?plpionOa
;

J.!

,

Identifiqtion appew nc3cessary to confirm that a detected
event was really a - @ ~ k t $ Confirmation
q
is important for
two reasons. Ope ja,te'
non-violating goiements to
take appropriate
$'iapnse. The second is to avoid
dirpute h m w :&!.
advancing conflicting intepretationr of
.ewi-he
Burmrm representative at
the Eighteen;I?J@&an
~ b q q q m e n tConference, James Barringtan, made a
&atwent of the problem:
After the most camW
qmest consideration, it seems to us
that the claim
,&vi~t,q i ~ that
n all nudear explqsi~ns
yhp&& bg means of national detection
can ,be
systetm, and that 40 hp&&t@naThntrol is therefore nect?ssaty,
leaves one vital qp&lid
u e f S b d It is: What hap ns in the
are d a dispute &to. h e facts of a #a;rfiwlar eventr Age&
all, hrwewr gaod they m
y be, the ktruments which record the
evmu do not get up md rpenl. What they do is to record data
whi& twined p x u n ~ 1 e interpret.
1
It is therefore not inconceiy-

ilcm.
,

gl&

..

abIC that interpretations may differ. How would a differmce of
rhir.lind be rwIv@' bnl& ,thaewere in existence some impartial iaternrtional &en'tific body acceptable to all the nudear
PBIW~Y&
whaK w c d o n would' be to settle such disputes, if
necessary dm markin3 ruch en uiries a d inspections as may be
considered by it to he cscentinl$ ,

Thus, e&ctive on-site imixction i s seen as an importint
supplement to distant monitoring if there is to be assurance
that underground puclek exptosions can be identified as
such. Out of this b u e rose the recent United states-'united
Kingdom proposal for an agreement banning tests, without
special inspection atrangements, in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water, as an alternative to an inspected ban
on all media. Earlier this k u e inspired the dispute over the
n u m b of inspection visits to be permitted. Until the Soviet
Union repudiated entirely the heme on which the negotiaa ENDC/PV.$ 23 Mar. 1962, p. 18.
a ~ c / P v . I §2, Apr. i962, pp. g-7.
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tioas had been f m c d , one of'the key divjsive issues was
Soviet insistence that.no more than three on-site inspections
should be allowed each year. The Western powers insisted
on a higher quota. At first they demanded a fixed number

of 'twenty and then proposed an alternative formula providing for a quota of twelve inspections or, up to a limit of
twenty inspections, 20 per cent of "the number of underground events" above the threshold seismic magnitude
roughly' equivalent to a 20-kiloton explosion.* For the past
year the Soviet Union has refused to consider this compm
inise. More recently, the Western powers have indicated a
willingness, in the light of newly evaluated Project Vela
data, to settle for fewer on-the-spot inspections.
Unfortunately, there is not much ground for optimism in
the publicly available evidence as to the effectiveness of onsite inspections as a means of identifying small underground
detonations. For identification to take .place, several very
difficult steps must be successfully negotiated? Aerial surveillance, employing various technical devices, must first
narrow down the area in which the unidentified event is
suspected to have occurred. Then, ground teams must try to
locate the area more precisely, "hopefully within a circle
of about 500 feet in diameter." This is an optimistic estimate
of what can be achieved. Finally, deep drilling operations
must be undertaken to attempt'to discover evidence of subsurface "radioactive fission products as positive evidence of
a nuclear detonation." Such drilling is costly. In hearings
before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
in 1960, i t ,was estimated that it would cost $378,000 once
the equipment was in place to achieve 100 per cent coverage
(63 holes) in the search for an explosion of 1.7-kiloton yield
at a depth (1,200 feet) too low to have left surface evidence
MSee the mmments of Brennan and Halperin on the difficultp of evaluating the eflkctive difference between three and twenty on-site ~nspections,
h Brennan, op. cit., p. 265.
&The following technical infonngtion comes from US. Congress, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection
Control3 of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban: Summary Analysis of Hea~(ngs,
Awl 19, 20, 21 and 22, I9610 (Washington: GPO, 1960) , pp. 13¶48-49.

of the explosion. A comparable search for a 20-kiloton arplo
sion would involve drilling a d l a number of holes (10)
far deeper (2,700 f a ) at an estimated cost of $835,000. It
would cost $94,000 to drill for a 100-kiloton explosion (4
holes, 4,700 feet). Another way to view the problem is in
tenns of the probawty of discove&g the radioactive zone,
within a predetermined 500-foot radius, with fixed numbers
of drill h o h . The results look like this:
5 holes
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These estimates, predicated on relatively hvomble terrain
conditions, suggest that larger explosions
nlazivefy
fewer d i h l t i e s of identification than smaller o m , but
that the latter ma).b e wry difficult indeed to identifj~In
denser groun& which lvoalg limit the explusion e
h mare,
a larger number of holes would be necessary to x h ~ the
c
samereenxh, .
More recent emmimtion of the problem s u p & thzt
i~llpmvddewtion tmhiquer and improved s a t q i e s £m
deploying demtion devices may reduce the number of unidentified undaground urploaions. While same riquirnnen~
feo. sn effective inspection system may thus be reduced, it
does aot scem that these advances ;alter substalotially the
basic considerations concerning identification requirements.
The problem is limited, in any case, to q mall number of
zones of high earthquake activity. Presumably, distant monitoring has no diffihlty identifying the country in which
such suspicious events occur.
Dierent considerations may itpply to atmospheric.or outer
spaoe explosions or a great many other activities that might
be prohibited or limited by atms agreements. With w i t h
dispersion of nuclear and missik capability, it m a y some day
become important to be able to identify precisely both the
.nature and the sburce of ekntr rhat appear to violate prohibitions on activities in the atrpqphere or space. If thc great
*

p~wa
a~ determined to onfwa s d prohibitiaor against

other ctaenforcement &ould pose .no
difficulty,
padded a bash has been bid far obtaining reliable evidence
to ideaffy violatiom whea thcy ocw.
l m p d t m sf 2 P k w m or 81 Arn~t~rneabt
1

Om contentious issue bas . k nwh&er inspection should
be limited ,to s u ~ i o of
n actual reductions of a r m or
whethar, ,inthe -&
(If the United States outline of p r e
visionr for a treaty on g e n d and complete disarmaAent,
"verificamngemec:nts"would be "necessary to ensure
throughout the dknmme11t process that agreed levels of
a
r
m
m
c
e
~
g
t
g
md
~ mad b e e s were n ~ exceeded."
t
The isme
i s m & m &find as thr question of 'koontrl of disazaamerit er over amaments." "Cbnmal over amax~ents"5 the
descdptim &vesl to the Unmtd,States propo~lrby Sovie&
representative0 who cxcoriatc itim a L'leg-z&ed system of
idtenmiod apionage."a
T h e United States representative to the Eighteen-Nation
Dkummsat Conhence, Arthur Dean, stated the principle
&kt "it L the nature of the obligation that determines the
type of controt which b 1 1 e c q . ' ' ~ 7 This is a wwfui rtandard
lmauw it allow didmination between a r m 1iaait;;ttionar
which do n- require imqmtion beyond what is neccsJary
€6 ~~tmwve
thrt a ~ e e d
atxiom have becn taken, and t;hw
which q u h mime dun
T k b t witqpq % a limited one comprising commit&%& tb dm6y fixed number$ rn quantities of armaments,
if sacb :fedticticin'is imeversfb~~
An obligation*for example,
to destroy a number of tanb or wanhips or aircraft clarly
fits tsh cat-*
ondc dest&yed, the weapons are gone. The
ody requh~~tht
for orurk~ite+
that the obligation has been
fulfilled it the opportunity to obs&vewhether the wc~pom
have indeed k n done may with.
,

,

USutmwnt br So*
Z"pmqwatia~e:
Zorin. in BNDC ~ k 0 6 , 2 4Apr. 196%
p. PI. 8c+ rLo hu stataaenr in ENDC/PVSI. 16 Apr. I&, p. 31.
a BNsepvs, 18AP. me ip. 1%
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Otha typer of,li,tni~l;ions~dnnlnd
more Eu-reaching
fication. When reduetiom we calculated as p r o p ~ r ~ n
ofs
forces existing at the oumt of the paamideo-tion
that
obligations are b e i q fulfilled nquireb verification of tbe
original force ,levels Q well as verification of the level of
forces remaining.after the reduction. When f o e s ire reduced to fixedJlcvek, confirmation &at obli8;ati~onsare being
fulfilled requires verificktion that remaining f ~ r c qdo.not,
in fan, exceed the qtablished levels. Both,these example,
involve ueriiication not only of what bqs ,been eliminated
but a h of what: mnainr. It is difficult to underspad how
one can reamwbly quarrel with thjlr assessment of ippection requirements if what is sought i s indeed, Ps Soviet
officids have frequently reiterated, "the necessary g u b
tees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed
upon will be strictly carried out."** Yet the USSR seems to
deny this simple and unavoidable logic.
The same considerations apply also to meaSures to reduce
or eliminate specified aaivitied, such ar production of materials of war. The only way to ensure that such obligations
are being fulfilled is to verify; often that will involve iafpectian to make certain that activities which have been r e d u d
or eliminated are not ~ e p l by
d orhen begun clrmhael
'It k thus not dicult to identify the limitatiom that imply
a necessity to inspea remaining capabilities as well as t b a ~
that have been eliminated; ongoing processes, as a class,.fit
'
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Ow of the charges Sovia reprpwntatives like to make
ir that the United Staw p m a its demands for inspection
because it .isinterested in information about Soviet strategic
targets. Again and again the Soviet delegates to disarmament
conferences and to the United Natians stress the theme that,
to
Mr. Zorin:

I

*

Secretary Rusk, in a very effettive and convincing speech
to the Eighteen-Natio~Disarmament Conference on 24
March 1962, refuted the Soviet arguments that the United
stat&-united Kingdom ihtpection proposals of April 1961
were designed to make possible espionage against &e Soviet
Union. He ~eemphasizkdthat the Western plan had been sup
ported by the Soviet Union in its essentials until the USSR
reversed its p i t i o n , and he went on to analyze the contemplated ins ection arrangements in some detaif. These. pr&
v i d d for L e d control pose at sites approv&dby the USSR.
One-third of the technical personnel and dl of the auxiliary
personnel for these posts would be Soviet citizens. On-site
inspection teams would visit sites predetermined by seismographic recordings, using Soviet transport, carrying specified
equipment, and accompanied by Soviet observers. The inspected areas, Mr. Rusk pointed out, could at most total
annually one part in 2,000 of the total Soviet area. Aerial
sampling flights would employ Soviet aircraft and apws and
have Soviet observers aboard.lsO
L
However, there can be no doubt that the purpose of inspection is to provide information, and inspection of some
of these limitations would no doubt supply information of
some strategic importance. Limitations on numbers of strategic missiles, for example, would involve inspection of
launching sites to ensure that the total number of missiles
deployed did not exceed the number permitted. Measures to
reduce the risk of surprise attack would also require precise
knowledge about strategic deployment. The range of meas4ENDC/PV$G, 24 Apr.
50 ENDC/PV.8#23

1962, p. 28.
Mar. 1962, pp. 14-15.
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may well h to diminish significantly the imprtanm of seaecy as a rafeguvd against e m q ,attack .
Furthermore, secrecy .may & , a diminishing aaret as maintaining it beam l a - a M f1- possible. The United States
U-8 flights apparently col,tected a great deal of information
the effect

abwt Soviet strategic capabilities and production f a d l i k
A good many unidentified spice satellites have 'ken orbited
by the Uniccd States and i g likely that at least some of,
than arc Sam@ satellites, able to perform m y 6ifl-t
reconnaissance functim. It is fprtpnate, in tenns of the st*
bility of mutual detmewe, b a t space atellites y y be e r e
useful in identifying fixed. installatio~thereby p r o w a g
lonpterm or strategic intelligence, rather than t a c t i d up-t*
@-minute targeting information. lHowwr, they should be
vety useful in providing,evidence of cumulative b n p in
the strategic &pitions of the counmes being rumeyed.
Thus, it may be t . t national,intelligence activities wi4 succeed in eliminating or vastly reducing the value senecy naw
hpl, although this trend may be limited by the growing reli;
ancc on nudear .delivery systems such as the United States
Polarb mbmarincs and Soviet missilelaunching submarines
.
that achieve secrecy by qnobilityma
How valuable sacrecy i s or what risk i s w e d by -emenu ta inrpoct stxategic facilities depends very much oa
what the w i a already b o w abut each other's military
d i s p D s i t ~It~is p i b l e , but not vesg likely, that,tlre USSR
know$ ks abokt United SPta stfategic dispiti~nsthzn is
cornonly bclievaf: it is po*cible. and perhaps mcwe likely,
that the United St&$& already lrndws a grood &a1 a h t those
of the Soviet ~ n f *Obvi~wIp,
~ .
&ssmmt of those condiderati-. har to take,iqto a . d n t %
the' over-all strategic balances, the ,gen&l relatiodips kiwecn the parties, their intentiom towaid eadi ow,and other variables not stibject
to precise mea~ure~ent.

- .

.*

Sompl3ng or an irupdva T W q w

l & n d o r n &rapling is an accepted technique in indbstrial
quality conwIs, foud and drug inspection, and so forth, and
its wes in the field of arms ~oqkol
.inspection are being in:
tewively, exploredeMThe idea behind 'this is that it k not
necesary to i m p ~ everything
t
in order to have hiqh warance that obligations are being fulfilled and violations are
not occuning. Arms coq~mlinspection poses the hitberto unencmtered sampling problem &at potential evaders may
seek to "beat" the sampling systepl.,Sampling strategies have
In general, however,
to take this ~ i b i l i t yinto ~ o u , n t W
&This ingenious d & m e is k m d a @ d with the mame 'of'Prsbr
Loub Sobn ef Hamad ,U&mrsity. Sae hjs &-pter, "Phasing of Arms Reduction: The Temturid Method," in David H. FdchI ed., d m Reducth
Program d Is.wml
&t, pp. l%.ff.
M 90 the $ e n d mdea o£ b~mpling'r~
~ to prms
C coatml
C ;Snspection, see &a ter by %lomOn, in Melman,
dt, pp. 425 &
L
a
u-. Jnt h . k n m d c by W, ct
at., p. L I , d
C. Scbdhg and Mortaa H,Halperi~,~
Strategy and Amrr Control mew Vork:
Twentieth Century Fund, 19612, p. 104. The latter stated the problem this
way: "An important diibrena htureen ordinary statisdcal sampling, and
the we of anm ling *a
an intelligent r d v , is @at the activitiu
king monimrd may adapt themselves to the he ling procedure that h
cham. If them is a limit, for example, oa che n u m L of nmplis &at an
be taken within a given month or a year, and the limit has been exhausted,
violatioar may proceed m i impuni until the next period btgint:
the
party bdng exlmincd
ma7 dt&erately create suspicious evidence in
order to @!xharutthe smq4c."
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themyis

that

if

a

wals m violations in the ins
evidence that violations am.
of a violation in the. ml
up danger signals. T h e
pling would enable i m p e d e
it is urged,u be high anto
fieiendy ancertain bf ruaresr to
TEie t d t - 1
impctIon scheme
S t a t a , ddtbagh' it doa i n m k elements
dearly a scheme kn -&dm sampling.. '9ht propkls spell bbt fsw'detilils and say mbg ctrrt.th pnd.h
would divide thei
berofap
.
191p~~aito
zones"
EBt tarn1
level ,of armaments, forces, and specified t p of activities
subject ib verification in 6ach ZOJW." 'I%
an a@
&d,
mber of z&ws would bk pmgrmiie'ly ibpected, the ones toJbc
inspected being chojcn "by ,procedures which would e n m
their selection by Panics td the k t y other than the Party
whose territory was to be inspected ar any 'p&tf isgcsociattd
with it." Once the zones to be2
w
'
'e
H
d
hqd Wit chogn,
the country to be inspetted would give Wdils as 'ttrthe-ldcation of the forces, armanients, or activities io'be b p ~ t d .
Arrangements would - be necessary to p r w d ondb$wied
movements a a m zonal b t l n i k i a The intipecta~~~
OM
tbat the d e d w objecq or a&$ouriy, muld -seek. to
w e e where they ; ~ e m ' a a ptod be and thatltheqm t
.
,
none that did not ap+ar onithe decked &to Under tbir
scheme, the gpvernmgihts of the nmntrier hqyaed ~ o a l d
hawe urat~dova the process.of &fining tbe axaka '& their
coi~ntr%land woptg; a6 .$~ubi*aeek
ta dp w in ppip#'$fpt
m a x i m a their own security in'tenns of the QP&bLawilable. The
doer no5 specify whetha thq &1t33i9n of tht
zones to be inspected wou1d.k ramdm m aot -(drown oat of
a hat, for
the p i b i l i t y 'bat
'It thus leavier$
?

'

'

,

-

.
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~~tote~%m~h,the!'~&~~iaoa,in~~&

governments witn advance1 lntelligmce rcsourccs would
seek to influence the &mice of zugm in ways that would ensure that inspection efforts served their interests to the great?
est extent possible. However it should be done, this scheme
coping with the problem -!hat
seems a promising step tod
too much .inspection,infor?fpationabout sa;ltegic facilitiek at
might be destabilizing, or,
least in present c~~mmseancet,
just as important, appear to be. Such a sampling techniqu~
also offen pr~miseof reducing the costs af'inspeftion.
The sampling metbod, in this case aPP1id geopPicalli
bas obvious relevapce to other criteria for d+hg iaipzctibq
tasks* If factories producing certain obj*
ha& 't!, be inspected. it may be possible to achieve higbly reliable i m p
tion without inspecting all of them. Similarly, with regard t?
p e r f ~ ~ ~ a nofc obligations
e
to reduce force levels or qmaments, some sample units or depots could be ins~cted.1s
such cases something akin to the procedure p r o p a d by the
United States for zonal inspection would have to be followed.
Declarations of total force and armament levels or of prduction facilities would have to be submitted. And where deliAte deterrent relationships would not he affected, p k c G
statements of locations and levels of activity in each facilit?
&rinstallation might have to be provided. Then a selected
mmple would actually inspected, and the conformance or
non-conformance of the observed facts with the declared
k t e of affairs could .beestablished. Depending on the nature
*f the activity being inspected provision would have to
bade to avoid transfer of forces, armaments, or activitier
from one place to a ( m e r . The sampling scheme in some
cases might have to provide for sampling inspection of undeJared facilities as well-factories that are not listed as proawing prohibited or regulated items, for example. Sampling
anay thus be appropriate for a wide range of prahibitions'or
iirnitaojS,m. PnesulluMy* th prbciple, of , tht United Stam
zonal scheme should be maintained: while only r selected
number of installations or facilities would be inspected initially, all would be eligible for inspectian to permit the Sampling to be done among the entire range of relevant objectit

.

. Tactbd or. St~ate& M ~ U T B I

If

b
w
c
1
3' i s '

tobe depended on for tactical-.or short-

h v i n g & &tiitpished from strategic br lOng-tm
warning, the t&hniial d i h l t i a and costs will be great:
Mormver, tactikd '%mm~ed
may.
ge fm reasons that are appartmt frbm theabape discursion of the relationship iif inspection to rmiegie h&ilfty,wjeopaidize the security of strategic
fotca. on whl& niutual deterrmce may d e d . J-e
Wianer bPl '&f&
to general agreement "on the desirability of ofithlt$~&
inspection and observation systems to those bf
i sait@c ~~tmre-thttis, those that monitor bdy such fao
kars as location, ntlmben and quality of k e s and weapdns,"
'$id on rvoidanh of a system that depends upon tactical infbrmatian requifing rapid transmission and quick r e a a i o ~ . ~
E k w h m , Mr. Wiesner has made dear that thib ipnsidetation applies to arrangements such as those at one time pofar rcduciag risks of surprise nuclear attadcornAny
such measures would depend on high speed and very reliable
communication and data procesing i ~ y s w If
; military disgbaitions of the parties wau itery dependent on the reliability of such systems3the systems would have to be very &liable
indeed. Furthermare, Mr. Wiefitr argues that the inspeaion
forcc.neded hid be as large as that required for general
and complete dkmament. In proportion to the advantag&
d£ such a spatem, its cdbts would be verg high.
t

I.

Time has important effects on inspection requirements.
One o f the mdperplming of dl arms control questions ir
_
1
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to avoid obsolescence of the inspection arrangements.
problem arises, in one form, in the intenml between the
a particular inspection need is identified and when the
ppropriate arrangements can be agreed upon and put into
ffect. Recent experience with arms negotiations suggests that
ch intervals are more likely to be long than short.
Perhaps the most striking example of the obsolescence efct w a ~the nuclear stockpile problem. By 1955 it became
clear that the amount of nuclear material in existence had

shifted radically as governments came to acknowledge this
fact. The dramatic turning point was the Soviet proposal of
10 May 1955, which said
there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control
for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. . The security of the
States signatories to the international convention cannot be
guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential
aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons
for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States9

..

As a result, negotiations focused on ways of arriving at partial measures of arms limitation until the Soviet Union again
reverted to pressing for general and complete disarmament.
There is no obvious answer to the problem posed by technological and circumstantial changes that occur between the
time inspection measures are conceived and the time they are
put into effect. Nor, as has already been suggested, can it be

e3dmq$I&.
bit, the
ultiplication of n d c l e ~
weago& hu I+
to relatively stable strategic relatiions8ips ltkia4 may -1
)the
budem inspection arrangefpli&ai:haw to
Perhaps all.
&a$ can 'liaehlly be said abodt this probiaa :ir*chn ,@m&
a.bility of significant changes affecting the inspccth r q u b
giienm has always to be borne in mind. ?"hcl
&at
$qptiatms may be pufiuing inspeaion arrhztgmm~
whIeh
have already been rt!+ml&redabsolete by -Intoand
cfn:utmtantial &&ge 'is k t h e r factor. mp1ihGag
nekotiaepg
and making it inordinately $%kIit(1;~1t
td
teach satisfactory agreeme&ss.
.
I
izisti'tuBon
Of cop%,. thc probl& d& no!' ehd with
of inrpectibn a m m g k t n ~ .The lattet risg . obsolk&ce
just much aft& they'have been put' into eEect aa before,
rnh that complete 'disarmament, including an effective
p hibitton o n arms resear& has not been instituted. To
this problem two responses seem relevant. One is to incarp o w provisions to &ake modification bf inspection arrangements pos~iblein agreements setting them up. This has been
done ip the latest United States-United Kingdom draft treaty
proposed for a complete nuclear test ban, which provides
£mperiodic review of the system (Art.XI)." No such specific
provision i s made in the latm United States draft outline
for a general and complete disarmament treaty, although
the notion of periodic review is by no means u r c l ~ d e dThe
.~
Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament seems at
least to leave the question open in the provisions vesting in
the Conference (Art. 41 (3) ) and the Control Council (Art.
42 (g)) general author with respect to the control procedures.
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Nations Doc. A/5200, 18 ,Sept. 1962 (ENDC/58, 2'7 Aug. lw
In fact, an obligation to keep the system under review at ttezleb rage is
implied in the proposed commitment "to ensure that the Intenrational Dbarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed
manner the cvbligations undertaken." The words "in thg: agreed manner" may
suggest a rather .more static approach than is implicit in the obligation to
ensure the O ~ n i z a t i o n "capacity
*~
to verify." The language applying to
the first stage IS slightly diibent from that quoted, but seems to have the
62 United

s l s r w ~

Another response is to ensure that the iqtemational control agency has up-to-date scientific and te&nological competence, adequate to enable it to app&e the inspection
arrangements realistically in the light of @anging science
and technology relevant to a n n s . Of course, meqber governments which themhelves have advwced s~@ntiQc
and technological capabilities can introduce evidence ar. to needed
changes in the decision-makingorgans of the control agencies.
Such a procedure seems definitely contemplated in the review
provision and other provisions of the most recent United
States-United Kingdom draft treaty for a complete test ban.
The earlier United StatekUnited Kingdom prop&, 4vanced in April 1961, seemed also to envision an - actire role
by the Administrator and the staff of the organizatibn. In
that draft the Administrator was required to
develop and arrange for the execution of a program of E W X W ~ ~
and development for the continuing improvement of tlae equip
ment and techniques used in all componenv of the System, and
. . . from time to time make recommendations to the Colnfnission regarding irhprvements to be incoiporated in the System.
[Article 9 (5) .]
The August 1962 proposal-vests copparable responsibility
in the Commission rather than the s@@,although the staff
is supposed to "=kt the..~omrnissi&.in carrying out i~
functions" &ti& V). While the United States draft outline
of the general a d copapLe.te dkamaglent treaty contains
no such provision, it doa charge the Admi+t~ator with
"inaking reports to. the Control Council on the progress of
disarmament measures and qf their verification, and on the
installation and operation of the verification arrangements"
(italics added). The power to report is the power to raise
issues for consideration. The Soviet p~opmdgives no such
authority to the staff.
Clearly, there can be no guarantee that agreed inspection
systems will be modified to conform m changing needs.
whether the needed adaptations involve refinements, or improvements within the limits set by the basic agreements, or
amendments in the basic instruments themselves. On the

contrary, effding such changw
since in interhational affairs, a1
agreement is the mwt difficult d
moreover, are unlikely as a rule to
mme countries are more likely to be
proposed &an* than others, andt'lomedb
interest in bringing
Thus, the decision to effect
san, warmly contested, political matter;
determine their positions by assessing the
and liabilities Political costs o
ures to improve inspection s
tion. But -proving to the
audiences that any pro
its absence the system
that&
eacy thing to do. Fat wedons, if recent expeHMt~~iri&&e, t q
any indicator, are unlikely+@&C q d t .
of ihe circumstintial changks liai$f$'i toL&e 'iieed
in the system may not be technological, but politicnl,
strategic, or economic, and getting agreement on the implications of such &an@
may be even more d i h l t . '
What will count most in bringing about c h a w will be
the determination of the principal p d a r to demon~aatt
to iach, other that Lhep are interested in pr&zx'_qnd
developing the arms control $~WRI. H a ~ ~ v c hnonle~
r,
tIte
conditiom 'fiquiring& a n p ih the sy~temzti~
very apparent
and v k y central, t h y may not, for i r a ~ a d ralrdhdp $+d,
pose v q dearmt rests of ihe pamies' intendow: @if& th$
is the realm of ~cfid'lapicalckmmunication; the inmprm- tian of evidmce will ulidwbtd#ybe difficult and will seldetn
taulr in mmhPaB;abJ,e
concl&iam. In cases of exmeme whknewr in the ryatem resulting from techaologid or &ier
change, the t ~ k &n
s always assess whether the inade!iitacia outwnec the advantages the system QW.
The t
h
e
to withdraw o
h
m
r
the system, or actual withdrawal, are
ranctiotu available to state intensely intirest~din btfnghg
about hpvwnenb h 'lhe ' ~ c t h arrangemats;'Ha*rn
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ever, for reasom spelled gut in earlier M X ~ @ I Mn&,@
resort to them sanctions will be, at mat, ix$qeqqe% ,,. ,, ,i
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Tim entor the paxa in wether way. Time 1~17
4*:b
mo* prc~iwr-t
to be &ieri~d
from kp~tisp*
WB$
thae b a wiolation it ib e
-its
govrqatg
i&tutc amgl@tius m-ra
In thk connection, it @
the victimn that them h ,a long mad Iropp
rn m e&sctive military qpocity. If ,o1aqu.
~ e a & # c - m bv iinvdvad, or a new w
&in. of - e m & lea&.,tbm31ghhbluepcbm
Cbigna,' prototype prodwtkn ,and tap~eex*g of a c production layoutr, p b 4 7 m ~ c t i o a (WW
special difficulties under the,circumstanca of iup
menti.. development of doctrines for tbe ewpby~
writ ob tho weapons, production of enough weapons tp
a c h i ~ qr
c ; e f k a , training of personnel, to actu#
dcrpbp~w~f ,f finished aptems which might, in
indve,, q l e x installailtiom. Violations a n ?&in .at
anp p i m t im (hjr d e m a t i c chain of events. But even efforts
to violate rwaints on existing weapons systems imply
of preliminary meawrp before a decisive military advantage
cap de deployegi or demonstrated. The other side of this coin,
however, is that once a critical military advantage is achieved
by violation of an a m agreement, the victims conkunt a
camparable chain of requirements before they cw redress
the balance by equivalent means. T h e victims may gain k m c
advantage vis-%;visthe violator from their ability to respond
ovtrtly. Nevq-theless, should a violator achieve a decisive
military advantage, the victims' security would be en&*
gered and peace would be threatened.
$i
would appear, therefare, that the funha back in the
&aip bf @latiom inspectioh can be effectively initiated,
ad''thelmotc pinu at which inspection efforts a n made,
L h r . . h r ,will
3 the s-rs
bc. The obvious quatior; t h e
fore, is whether prepaqahm to violate cannot ;shkmeIva

be p6rahibited.

Thi issue arax in acute form with respect to the moratorium on nuclear tests. When the Soviet Union resumed
testing on 1 September 1961, President Kepnedy several
times expressed concern over the advantage that country had
gained by testing after a long period of secret preparation. $iif!&I
In his press conference on 7 February 1962, the President
referred to the need fa "methds of inspection and contrd
which could proten us agaimt the repetition of prolong '
secret pmp~atiomfor a sudden series of major tes&'Subsequently, in hia radio-television address of 2 March
1962, tbe Pmident, rtfming to the proposals the UnitLd
States an4 che-zUriited Khgdom would introduce in the
Gene% n e ~ i ~ t i o a&id
s , ttiatr"nav modifications win
be d k r g~
h tht gghe'ofnew ex~erience,"~
thus giving rise
to speculatbn &at the United States would propose new
mea&k& to' prohibit preparations for testing. 1n the event,
no such proposals were made, m, doubt because of the difficulty of .defining prepariatiom b r the' purpose of such a
prohibstion, and &&se such a prohibiiiod would involve
i m p t i o n amangemme even more onerous than those which
it had heady proved difficult to negotiate with the Soviet
Uniod.
In theory it should be possible both to incorporate in
a m agreements limitations oh measures antecedent to the
actual production or deployment bf prohibited weapons'and
to m& arrangements to i ~ p e such
a
meqsures. Such wondary ihiditationsi howevw, might operate to'the disad&tage df~states,that $lfill their obligati~ns,since successful
violation of secondary prohibitions would have a bigger
pay&
would violatian df 'the primary prohibitions
alone. The coniinued'exiistence' of' r&a=ch and production
hcilities.a d stc@cpilesQCweppn components would enable
the vicfip.of vk&tiods, to take. compensatory step more
rapidly than mu$dbe m i b l e ,if all such s e c o n capabili~
MUS. Annr
series W d 57.

Ct~nmoland Dt-

als "Nuclear T
ment Agency, Ge=

Agency, I%armment '%en€

and D b ~ m e n g *US. Arms Control and DbarmaSaia No. 2, Mar. 1962, p. 17.
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ties lh-83ken i3lmInate&#r;wevex,
cii;i;&i3'jirninthe
&mndarg capabilities might also operate to the relative
disadvantage of the Westerrl coutntrks, which pmbably find
it more difficuh::W& &3ta1itarian oountries to main&
&pedal1yeof scientiota and tech;
aiaence of iRspected sccid I& &chbppormnitks to detect
1vidbti8rlir't&aw~1d
otherwise be
::d iL:*
.Tikih%&isii&l factors into ~ccoudt,&hefoore,itmight
der'd desirable to move toward 'agreements that prOe5bit not

oiilf the prbduction and deployment of weapons, bat also
those '~condarymeasures which lend themselva to reliaYde
ihpection. As the scope of a m s agreements broadetls, so
wit1 the scope of the inspection arrangements and the n k w
bef of inspection tasks to be performed. The existen& df a
of interacting inspection techniques and spamake it possible to extend the reach .of ,the
s+ti& to include such secondary meas'ures as stodrpiling
cif ' critical components, testing of prototypes of prohibited
dkdpons, training of personnel, tooling up of facilities for
pduction of prohil ed weapons, and preparation of weap
o*
h e key to4s u c c ~ f u lperformance of these inspection
fu$tio& will be the identificatiiin of those critical set~ndary $neasures that have utility only in connection with ihi
prohibited primary act or .insome other way give unmirtalable evidence of an intention to violate an established
imary prohibition. This will be formidable task and,
. , 6 e w. of h&,,*tics
of distinguisbint among ti
$&&tl

e

r e +

M a h t Kennedy n&mwqx&iMly to &is problem "Some may mpp
[pa unrnrieted m o t ~ u r n
on nuclear tests] again, keeping cnu
preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice,
particulatty jlP a d e t y oC k e choice, we cannot keep topflight reimthb
concentgang ,on the preparation 04 an e z w m e n t which may os ms not
take place on an uncertiun date in the future. Nor can law u c h n i d b b oratodes be kept fully ahst mi a sandby W s waiting for some &hermtkm
to break an agreement. This is ngt m q l y cult or inawroenieat,+
hawe
expla* this alternative thoroughly a6d found it irnpomible of execution?
-

us,,to try it

19td.;

1%

FW the time 7b&
e&a6 & a t d b; eirde
lfnk the technical and politkal d l j o * jip!V.'W
.t$lyicl
do IIDt -L urn-*
.the PWW to &ductd&&&

tivities m y , for some time to me. be a 'timtkito govemmenrs that they will be able to rcbpad*&
ately to violations of primarp prohibitlorn b). 6ments.
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It seems likely that, in most,circumstancebttotal
tions will be eacier to impect than partial ones .and
of violations easier to interpret. The dificulty of
nating between what is permitted and what is prohibitd i s
thus eliminated, or at least reduced.67Morpover, to dimqq
a small number of prohibited items or the small-scale-preformance of a prohibited activity is to discover clear evidence
of a violation only when the item or the activity hw been
totally prohibited, In general, the task of inspection willr&
facilitated by the dearest and most complete possible d & ~ &
tion of what regulations are agreed upon. If the likelihoodof friction in the implementation of arms agreements k to
be kept to a minimum, moat arms agreements will have to
be lengthy and complex documents.

T h e reliability of inspection arrangements can dten be
incremd by bringjing to bear the mutually supporting p
tentialities of the,various appropriate techniques. Considrr;
for example, a ptbhibition of further production of vehicles
for delivering nuclear warheads. The primary means of inspecting suc6 a lkitation would be i;hysital inspection of
plants k n m to have the capatiility to produce such weapons.
This technique might be reinforced by efforts to keep mck
of the activities of persoanel known t c ~have experience in
such production, by checking on inventory records of c r i h l
67Epfen

mal pdsibitiow may not eliminae grounds for dt-

as

to what is permitted. Durn a prohibition on cEe3Jv.ery vehida inelude a
prohibition on manufacture of cmqmnenW On b c h i n g @?
On miirsik

fesearch? On training missile crews? For a suggestive analym of thia gemmi
problem, see ScheIling and Halperin, op. tit, pp. 109-113.

e o a a p a t s Q£ the w e 8 W and of major fpaehbe toolr
nehdcd for urch p-tjot~,~
seeking to detect &&-opt
tcsu of amplet+ or.newly cslclpkted v @ i d ~ r 4
, ~ by
aerial and perhaps spacebared ~uweillanceto detect lugeacale produaim activitia and unusual moyicmentr of critical
known to k pertiof thew techniques
may well be others that
: % ~ a ~ 2 8Wt O
hP X ~ ~
"

,for example, might invdve

f snch pFoduction. , .
as w ~5b&c'@&14r cofiftt&mation04 h p
' ~ p 1 ~ y :aay
i n hmmee ymfd havc io
ntkeaitle~and.opportunities, jfzdgmemts
.be:the wiurmce &at violaticin -d:
be
I

"fhle 8-

the mi- p a & l c ~ g m e m a Hmww,
;
the pripdpk
that the degm of achievement of the several gasnls oE haspection is likely to increase with the number of alternative
of ;imp&m is an important one since the more

diffkent kinds of limitatim are bring w e , the more
d2E;ancat techniqqer d m a ; n will be.in,w
*ur

.

. .

%

fhek are mrnponend fh&-itrii'*$ideF "dpeddp
ch*teri&d
oC. ih
object being controlled, "e~eciallydifficult %O rodztw ,tm.both." &e Mpw
by Phdp, in Frisch, op. at., p. 110. Phelps
not b j k w iaspecdap of
&tical components is a very significant tech& ae Ibecaa$e & ttre -tim
ease with which they a n either be d i s p d
ar mbUitoted hr.
.
Phelps points out that this may
of inspection, as production techni
mutJUK a d as tBe v @ h k b
&&, . I l l .
~P&inFri~&~dt,,p87.
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mitted by any one? Moreover, Mr. Wiesner has pointed
to the opportunities this principle offers-when it is possible
to exploit the interaction effects of inspection techniques
appropriate to a range of different arms limitations-to
economize on the total effort needed to achieve desired levels
of confidence in inspection. It should be recognized, however,
that this principle tends, as John B. Phelp h a recognized,
to contradict the argument that progress in a+ reduction
can best be made by singling out individual measures that
lend themselves most readily to agreement.
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M v w OF mm CXW&CUKWWV ~ v e arrangements
r
&r inte~national inspection of l a m regulations has ftxused on the
o r g a n k i t i d .hmres: whether, for example, inspeaion
should be " i w ~ a & m d " or "national," and whether inspectixqg and
oqpnhtion s t a 5 should be "impartial"
or b u M , as the Soviet Union has proposed, rdect what
they call the mrld's division into ''camp." Inmpably,
g0-a~
ba$e had to be concerned with the implications
for other invrnational organhatiom of decisions m n m i n g
the pmjeceed international control agencies. The issues have
been confused fexrthier by the failure to distinguish clearly
between the arms control functions on the one hand, and
rbc development of measure8 far the maintenance of international peace and world order, as armaments diminish, on
the other. It is especially important to differentiate between
the requirements of arms regulation in the emly stages and
the requiremenu that would k generat& should there be
major national dimmammt.
RsdprOCQl w. lntsrnaffmonal
inspection

For historical reasons, negotiations on arms regulations
have until lately been concerned exclusively with proposals
for multilateral agencies and multilateral inspection arrangements to superintend the process of national disarmament.
Late in 1961 the Soviet Union reversed its previous acceptance of the principle that a nuclear test ban should be super- ,
vised by an international control organization, and proposed
instead q a t inspection be carried on by existing nati~nal

increasing attendon: In A u p t 1%MiB, .t&e.Unit&
and
the United Kingdom introdmaxi. & new prqxaab on the
cessation of testa in all media which bJ&
basic monitoring
by national means with a superim
.inta~mtjow1
control
agency that is to have Borne direct monito~ng.capabilities
and guaranteed accm rights for on-tbcspot imipcction. The
United StatesUnited Kingdom propoed!ir a respgxzse to a
memrandum submitted by the eight soaUcd 'fanaxramitted" participants in the Eighteen-Naw @&e~ence in
Ceneya on 16 April 1962.7s The new pachp~&*.-everb

Y. Furthemore, the feasibility.of eon(titutlng by
an interd
W r e d number of high17 qadBed
et with the a
wmtpza, t
ma on =d
be m t m s ~ f l t k ~

tistrar mpnm-,

che *ties ts the treaty of all-the & m *aof. the
ylnd'sf
.
,.'
ita assmment of the cmxmmd event.
#*Theparties to the meaty muld be free to &termhe t&e& &&an 'Wh
regard to the treaty on the ba& of reports *shed
by /tit&. h't&badm&
CQ-".
ENDC/FV.21, 16 Apr. 1962, pp. 21-22.
inf;bfiP

departs from the eight-nation memorandum in its .insistence
upon paranteed access and a provision for an intergovmmental control organ father than a "non-po1itical" scientific
agency as proposed by the eight uncommitted nations.
The various proposals for test ban arrangements no doubt
reflect the particular tech~nialproblems inherent in an
agreement on this subject. But involved also are the basic
purposes of impection, which art relevant to all agreemena
to regulate arms. The issues un be examined independently of the technical amsideratiam unique to a t a t ban.
An important 'kpestion is whether it is always necessary
tbat the arnmpments s h d involve elements of "&partial" collection and appraisal of the inspection data,18 as
distinguished from "reciprocal" arrangements under which
the parties inspect each other. The latter are sometimes
called "sides inspection." It appears that, if the primary
purpose of the inspection arrangements is to provide reassurance to the main parties thzt obligations arc being fulrdproeal inspeaion in some circumstances may not
only be as good as impartial arrangements but many even
o h advantages. For one thing, the world's main armammts
problem involve reciprocal relations between the two great
power blocs-the Communist states and NATO-and many
of the lesser arms problems involve direct relations between
two states ar group of states, such as those betweem Imel on
the one hand and her Arab neighbors on the other, and
betwet% India and Palrisean. Reciprocal rontrol arrangements, therefore, might apply to h e urns regulations
which are ,essentially reciprocal in charpaera
If certaih conditions exist, it is no more diffitult to meet
the technical requirements for inspection through reciprocal
~ F O oonvdmce,
T
such system will be reSe2Tct8 to hemafter aa " ' i m p
h'y simplified description of a range of complex
W," d
that is is
~
i
b On this
i
~
~mbjle*, sce Fred C. IUC, Altsnutfia df$macksr
to the I n b e p r r a t h i Organixatron of Disa~mmtmt ( h t a Monica, Calif.:
Thc RAND Corporation, February 1962); La(owencc S. Finlcelstdn, "The
Urn 434 Reciprocal I
&n," D w d s b ( N w e m k 1982) ; and BuU, "Two
&inch ofCon=*&.
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pp. 15ff.

arrangements than through impartial ones. T h e fint
tion is that the parties be relatively few and or-&
sides. as are the kaior Dower blocs, although there r n d &
exceptions to this prin~iple.'~The other condition ir dhqt
inswction should not require too deep or extensive &
& i o n of the sovereigntior terrain o i the parties. 1f -vh;
is involved is intimate-inspection of United States e l e c t r w
companies, for example, or detailed interviewing of unite&
States citizens employed by the Atomic Energy Commission,
the people of the United States and the Congress are liWy
to prefer international inspection teams to teams of Communists. In any case, it seems that agreements that are likely
to be negotiable in the early stages of the progression toward
Igeneral and complete disarmament will not involve deep
penetration. Given the existence of these two conditions
there is no reason to believe that the difference between
impartial and reciprocal patterns of inspection would significantly affect the likelihood of the parties agreeing to whatever inspection facilities may be necessary. Marginally, the
reciprocal approach appears to offer some advantage from
the point of view of easing the negotiations, since the parties
would not have to negotiate about such organizational questions as staffing, budgeting, and voting, which have plagued
all the Dostwar negotiations on disarmament.
In addition, reciprocal inspection arrangements might
offer some operational advantages. Since the parties would
be employing their own trusted personnel, the hazards of
sabotage of the inspection systems, incompetence, and unweliability would be reduced. Governments would be better
able to appraise the reliability of the information collected,
and there could be no doubt that information collected under the system would be directly and promptly available to
the governments." Reciprocal
systems might be less vulner-

a

r
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Antarctic Treaty provides for a kind of reciprocal inspec
under impartial schemes but the pravi~tes-UnitedKingdom draft test ban agreeobscure on this score. See W6, A I t c'9Ywim

oE placing the emphasis where it
*ality -that an adversary relationship exists, drat (the!
sibillty rests on rhc parties for reassuring s~ch~othm
obligations arc being obsetvd agd";Wtt;ttrak
L Gm
interest in continuing && apeqm&a.t, +Ont
might be that the partia 'webH
&to negotiate with each ~the,
the system. Negotiating migh
nities the direct relationship h d l d offer the
public exacerbation of their diEemeqi.lf
so inclined. The existence of formal mu
for considering such matters might make .privaedli@akm
mom difficult and might, indeed, provide .pl ba%ti€!ik
temptation to resort instead to partisan a
other hand, the reciprocal relationship
advantages of the pressures fos acmmm
no doubt develop in a multilataal f o m , . d
parties would presumably retain the freeto rsek~Ihm
tial + p c d offices, conciliation, or mediationi
The facx ,that inspection is reciprocal does not exclude
the possibility that the primary parties might choose to s&
third-party support for their positions. For i n s ~ c e ,the
adversaries might choose to gs8ocistc U~BCTS
with them in
the inbrmation collecting eE~rt; they might reveal or
share collected information with selected or with all gsvcp~l- *

~
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ments. In eases where impartial suppart may bq an important
faaor in strengthening the will of a p v v e n t to respond
to a violation, it would be free w.peek qu+ ~ b ~ p r. !.Recip
?.
rocal arrangements thus would leave ,qQie,iptlon4 o p p to
governments and, by doing go, might in&eare.,* & w e n &
effect of the inspection arrangements. l L e c i ~ $ p a n g z ments do not necessarily exclude servini the, m ~ b m
purpose of inspection-to provide evidence ?bouti, pystern's operation to a wide audience-while s m @ ~
primary purpose which i s to provide the principally c--d
governments with the evidence they need to' a&mije'(i' ' 1
system's perf-ce
in relation to their nati-1
'interes~.
Clearly though, among agreements to limit ,a&$: ;&ere
will be some impartial systems, either because the dbjetti bf
control are spread among too many countries to w i t a
reciprocal system; or because the depth of penetration would
be enough to require that the inspection apparatus %ave:an
impartial cachet; or because, as in the case of the test ban,
some governments are too deeply committed to the h @ a w
tial fonnula to permit the adoption of alternatives. H e
the basic lemons of reciprocity may still be applicable. Even
impartial systems should be designed to permit the principal
adversaries to be reassured, and to reassure each o&m* as
to the working of the system and to facilitate the h ' 8 e w
of the most reliable possible information to the gv-mtrs
with m a t at stake.
To return briefly to the test ban, it should be \clear from
this analysis that the idea of a reciprocal system is not naesk l y undesirable at all. The reverse may be true. The .inadequacy of the Soviet pmposal for national insption: is
not that it provides for a reciprocal system but that t&e
reciprocal system it provides for may not be adequaw to
permit high assurance that the obligations of the propwed
treaty are being fulfilled. That is because it allows for no new
inspection facilities beyond existing national inspeetion resources. In any case, there is reason to doubt whether very
great assurance, with respect to underground exp1osio.q~at
least, is achievable at all. Like 'many other a m limitation
,

&e

%h
I&(!

issues, what is finally involved is how much risk the par
ties are willing to accept. Here the question is whether the
risk that the Soviet Union might successfully violate an
agreement which prevents the United States from testing
outweighs the advantages of having the USSR under the
obligations of the treaty with its imperfect but still relevant
provisions for detecting violations.*
Although there is, this analysis suggests, scope for the
operation of reciprocal national inspection systems in the
supervision of agreed measures of arms limitation, the inter.
national dialogue still focuses mainly on impartial systems3
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will concentratd
on some ot the organizational problems of the latter.

:

i

I

Impartial Staffs

I

7

The backbone of any international organization is its
international staff. This is especially true of the staffs of
projected arms control agencies, because of the burden the
sta& will have to carry in performing the main function of. , '
such agencies-providing information about the fulfillmen
of obligations under the basic arms control agreement -- Governments will for some time to come make their o
decisions as to whether the structure of obligations an
inspection procedures continues to serve national interest#"and hence to justify their continued participation. The control agencies exist mainly to supplyLthemwith the informatioh, supplementing information that may otherwise be
available to them, on which such decisions can be based. ,
While the stafb will have important functions in servicing
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77 The editors of The New Refiublic commented as follows on the August
1961 United States-United Kingdom proposals: "In continuing to seek the
facade of an international control system, the Administration has, in our
view, unnecessarily encumbered US negotiators.
The United States has
never proposed an international inspection system capable of detecting an
Soviet tests, and the possibilities for violation left by a national inspection
system do not seem to us to expose the US to greater danger than would
the proposed international system." See "Policing a Test Ban," I3 Aug. 1962,
pp. 6-7. This editorial places the issues in correct perspective by anphuirm g that the differencebetween what it terms "national" and "international"
spstems is not what determines the effectiveness of the system,
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the systems' organs and in perbming tbc,
housekeeping function# tbat go with pay me-scale enteri ~ handling
prise# their r&un d'&aewill be the w 1 1 ~ tand
of information.
Staff arrangements should be judged by thir Ytandard and
no decisions about the composition or management of the
staffs should be allowed to interfere wi& the efficient fulfillment of these responsibilities." What doa &ir.inply?
It is well to begin with the acknowledgment that.& idea
of a perfectly clear set of constitutional iI1struaW .withe
staff for the performance of its inspeaion duties irr ilksory.
Every effort should, of course, be made to clarify t h ~ d a t u r e
of the inspection task-when, how, and by whom i-ction
is to be undertaken, and what is to be done with the Wults.
But, in the last analysis, agreed provisions in the b d c instruments will be obscure or incomplete; they will m a y
not be able to provide for all the changing c i r c m m s t a t t c & ~
which the inspection amngements will have to dml; -h
biguous or imprecise instructions will often emanate &Y&I
the representative organs, among other readom ~
U thc
W
instructions will often have to be couched in language tbrr
compromises political difkmnces. Although every&% ~pab.
sible should be done to reduce the burden of judgm-t the
staff will have to carry, the place of human judgmmt in .die
£ait]hful execbtion of assigned responsibilities a ~ &
&
eliminated.
This last consideration argues for a staff that is not dependent on internal consemus as a basis for the perf~matice
of inspection functions. At the top it implies an ahinismtive head able to take decisions within the lim$ts of his
authority." This consideration definitely argues against a
collegial-type authority that would have to achieve unaqim:
ity before issuing instructions to the staff. The Soviet "troika"
>

.

int h a been W e by Wncoln P. RloodcId. See his The Psk'&s
gi~~l,
bp. dl., pp. 19-23.
78 The United States-United Kingdom proposals of August 1982, to 'baa
wa la all environments, mck to e s m W such authoriq &rr thR emzadtrr
oScm of the 0qpni;ration.
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thing, it f&wg horn what has bpen raid-.abq~t'.tlq
,r& qf
infgmsa&m : Iyis-B-vis participating gpv-giq,
:-

vidualr who ue formal represen
than members of the intmatio
A wiant of this scheme w a s actually
United States and the United
ban treaty proposed in April 1961.
anced at all levels and in toto: o
would be nationals of the USSR, another
nationals of the United 'Kingdom and the W
remainder would be from o
would be headed by nationals of countries athm:
in which each post was locate
cal stafb of on-site inspection teams in Sovia
be composed entirely of British or United
and vice versa. Thus, this ostensibly rnultil-&
agency would incorporate an avowedly recipro~al
with respect to s&g
arrangements.
t 3'tiyvd
The United States-Unitad Kingdora draft treaty foUdwCbd
the general thmst of the United Nations Charter in ,kyim#
d m the principle that:
:,.GL.~~
T h e Administrator and the s M shall not seek or F&W h m
tionr concerning the peifomance e£ their duties ~~
authority external to the Organization. They shall r e f r r ~-.
any action which might. reflect oq their s t a t ,at
~ .iqtepi3#4~4
officials and employees responsible only to the Or anization.
L

f

8

Each Party underrakes to respect the international'C f
of
the responsibilities of the Agrninistratmr and stag mddn6tt&&@
to Mueme them in the $Lischarc&.theirduties. fk
G(+]-.
. ii

At the same time, the proposed arrangemenu regadhgmh
tiomlity distributiom and functions unmistakably implied
that some members of the staff at least were to have a nacharacter. This arrangement was bound to lead to confbian
and make for real uncertainty among staff membm, vr~to
how they could fulfill the obligations regarding imp&tia]:ify.
This amalgam of provisions represented, amorig ,othez
things, a Western campromise with the Soviet insist-e on
a tripartite ideological distribution in the staff. Western
insistence on maintaining the principle of impartid6ty was
no doubt influenced by concernover the implications fog the

M e a p e d Umtd Nations S e c r a d of .&&und that
might be reached with respect to the nuckar tat ban
It might be better to acknowledge m d W y that notionnl
reprentation is a legitimate and useful function inh st&,
provided national disagreement ir hot p b i t t c d to ohthe performance of the inspection fuectholp. The ~erult
might be a staft with two delontirThe first, with the Adminirator at the top, should be impartial, composed pob.
ably of nun-nationals af the major parties. The sacond & ~ l d
be a v o w d y n a t i o d in c ~ m p i t i o nand h m 5 1 ~ ~ ~0XXlpbt9~
ing prcdomjn%ntApnaticmib of the principal parties, but sub
ject to thsadministrative direction of the impartial memberr.
A better d t d w might be a completely impartial st&,
provided adequate arrangements muld be ma& for the
unimpeded flow of all inspection data to the participating
governments either directly or &ram& their representative
in the eolleaive organs. However, such a 8taE could hardly
be created without including a large n u m b of nationals of
Communist countries. Since the Communist countria do
not accept the principle of impartiality, the staff would at
best be part impartial and part national in its orientation.
Thus, a purely impartial staff seem unattainable. Frank
recognition of this fact from the outset might help to avoid
an obscure situation and could capitalize on the advantages
of national representation in inspection staffs in terms of the
usa to which inspection informatian is to be put. The argument that the impartiality d arm^ control stafi must be
maint.imed because of implications for the United Nations
Secretmi+ ir open to quation, parth1aly since at best Mlch
impivWty an be only partly hlfilled. In any care, while
verbally advocating it in their 1961 proposals for the tat ban
mpizatiun the Wtsttrn powerr, a c t t d y conceded the prindpk. The later p p a I s 9 advanced in August 1962, do not
repeat the oomplicared povhiow regarding nationality distribution. T h y p v i * only that consideration should be
given to selming pmnnel who are nationals of participating staterr. (An. VI (3) ); thrt personnel should be obtained
on ;ro wide a geographical basis as possible (Art. VI(4)); and
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that on-site inspection teamr should be dom
territory would not be inspected by n a t i d ,of tb#t
which controls it (Art. VIII (10) ).
It is clear that the primary purpose of ins
-the supplying of information to go
subverted if decisions concerning the pe
tion functions were subject to obstruction by vera:
applies to the representative political orar wen ~rpthe administrative staff. However, it should be
that the ability to obstruct is a corollary of bei
power. Moreover, other states may often be in a
to obstruct inspection without exercising a farma1 vtth ;k
state on whose territory an onaite inspection is'bcing conducted, for example, has an ability to obstruct. The difference
between a Tight and an ability, however, while nunn*~in
some ways, is important because of its effect on the r&n
of other states to obstructionist tactics.
Vetoes may significantly affect inspection s y s t m in#&B
direct ways. For example, the Soviet Union's insistence am
the right to veto the over-all budget for the nudear tat barn
organization, whatever its justification, carries with it &e
capacity to hamstring the inspection functions. The stmi
is true of the veto over the appointment of the chief-ofctn
system's staff. T h e principal powers certainly have rm
portant interest in this appointment. But by refusing .to
agree to any candidate, any of them might be able to rcnda
the inspection system inoperable.
What is significant about such veto rights is &at they
provide a legal screen behind which noncompliance with
the system's obligations may be hidden by any nation b a g
the veto power, if it is so inclined. Although mch c d w t
will be taken as evidence of a nation's intent to obstruct the
system and will carry the risk of whatever consequences may
seem appropriate to the other parties, much opportunity for
obscuring the basic issues will inhere in such veto pruvisioi~.
The victims might find it very difficult to convince o&er
governments, or even the populations of their own comtries,
that such tactics, legally permitted under tbe terms of,the

qpepe
l zka jwtidy the hamtbs response a e obviously
appropsiate to prohibited actst
So long as governmental dedi$om in~mgonscto insperion
inkmmtim are not dcpeqdent upon collective judgmmts,
it appears to b e k 1 m m t , whether or not unanimity is
in decisions: of'caatrd agency organs about the
infiamntm wlkcteib Obviously, $tothe extent that govanm e d adan d e w & m:dmisioxmof international orgam.
vemes wai.&idt-.
Bw rs hod been suggam& such 001rmk mare likely to conlrapomm to
than to major o n a No wikective enforce
merit ~
~ ~ . imy-slbnificana
I o E
are naw pmible, d.altbo;us21,
or saacticpw not hvplving tha use of fmce
h?iae~wes
might bc applicable,
04 thr wWe it seem preferable to M v e thc control sp.
tans apexshe to reiReom:e the presstxres on the major powar
to fl~!aamre
each other and to negotiate theit-minor dig=emceg: This .$ag@pb
thot lit* reliance n d be p k c d on
aolledive drcidow;-evenas to-tlreinteqxeta:tion of evidence
d m d by the inspection systems.
,
In anp case, a great powm cannot be forced to.act against
ig:pUiU Whber r veto is ifbrmaS,lp.ipWuced in the pro=
in fact exist. Thk
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as to, w b e h
stage have been falaled as the pro
to tbE 1IYentgtpge. what eve^ lzalguage
that the pmgsl.dcm

, no psqp?s8 will in
,

I

.

Rdutiow With l n r t e r ~ O
o r~g a n i d n s
The performance of inspection functions would not be
significantly affected by str6ctural relationships between control organizations and the United Nations.80The United
80 On this subject, see Finkelstein, "The United Nations and Organizadons for the Control of Armaments," fnternational Organization, Vol. XVI,
No. 1 (Winter
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DishWament tion on (ID0
the hamework of &c 'United Hat
permits anp: of a numb& of re
Assuming no O ~ C ~ pVt dCu r e r are
relationship s ~ m an9
s more or soy ias 1
to hditnte the p&orbance of thc inspeedam

a & w t e 'fnkhtian.

ae krpr opm,>nevi?nhdear,*
two organizations might be
in the eirirtenct of the new agency. For one th&
operation would make possible the most efficient
ment of the available technical and, more especidl
resourca. Secondly9the new agency i s likely to
the experience and expertbe IAEA will by thep
mulated. T h e rvne conriderations would apply
separate oapnbmtion to rupervire a nuclear ten
into being More the general disarmament or
There ie another consideration that various
thee problems have emphasized. The new
agency will have a hard time recruiting and
Regor3 of the d&my
Committee O S ~US. PO
Atomic B n q y Agmtp (Wauhingmn: US.
Ma 1962).
Jme btat Unit4 States-Unitcd
81 See
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Prinrb of highly trained penomel it will require if it an
oEez &em only relatively routine inspectiondutie~.~
Moreaver, the agency will have to maintain an up-to-the-minute
knowledge of advances in science and technology relevant
to armaments, which will probably require the establishment of advanced research facilities within the agency. In
the field of nuclear knowledgea IAEA has constructive responsibilities md research facilities, both of which will no
doubt develop progressively over the years. Thus, IAEA's
functionr.inthe field of peaceful uses of atomic energy might,
if they were incorporated in the disarmament organization,
provide partial solutions for both of these prablems which
ID0 is certain to face. IDQ's inspection functions would
doubtless involve cooperation of hrious sorts with other
intematiopll agencies, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorologid Organizatioh., While closer study of this problem might lead to
diffment condusions, it seems likely that such needs could
be met by coopention agreements, perhaps in the pattern of
the agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

'

a B i n S E M , "The United N a W and OrgtnizaEfma for thc Control
of Armaments," o& cit, pp. 11-18, and Fcld et ~ 1 Op.
. ~ cil, p. 21.

THE
THEME OF THISANALYSIShas been the tension
two Western conceptions of the a s s u i a n ~demanded
control inspection systems. One conception, a min
one, emphasizes the desirability of limiting inspec
quirements to whatever is needed to ensure tha4 viola
agreed limitations do not pose significant threats to
security and to the balance of mutual deterrence.
ond emphasizes the desirability of providing high assuranc4
that obligations are being performed and that violations wil\
be detected whether or not they significantly affect the se-'
curity of the parties and the balance of power.
Boih conceptions accept the basic principle that !&C "@-'
arinament process has to begin with partial measurei;.
;
relatively intact the present reliance on nation4 plibt&$
forces to maintain security 'and the international @&
ance. Both approaches acknowledge that perfect inspecdi&
is not feasible and both seek to reduce risks by maintaining
national capabilities adequate to keep within acceptable limits the possible consequences of violation. Both ackn9;w1p&e
the f i c u l t y of reaching agreement on the i
rangements that would he required by more
measures of armp reduction. Both emphasize the a.vqmqgq
of taking such limited steps as can be.agreed upos t . *&~
or halt the spiraling arms race, to reduce the risks
,gats
of the arms competition, and to gain experienqe ,in,-op%ra&q,
systems to regulate arms. Both seek to profit frm -&,e.@wq.m
tage offered by the possibility of postponing q e :p-iqre !farreaching arms reductions, which will either be f@i@&d
by the grow@ of international codidench or hiliw.w
-.
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w i l l posc evere rklu md require onerous inspection arThc tmt~appma4ae-sd i e in their appakal of the degree
ob fnrpectka seeded to make +be
the partial measures
of x - e c ! i d n &a
approach, which m b
,emphasizes national :
t o u h n e g ob
it map k mid to be smtegyd a t e d ; it ten&#rol*qv j.z~pe&o$ ~ g e m ~ ~ , , q x c l u r i v e l
in terms of these &q&&d m i t e . A s@t"emii'bpllbdon ~tlb
stantial remaining &d6&1 &@biliti& ' a i d 'nbr be wry
sensitive to minor d~@d6ns
becdtbe they ~ 1 3 : o tlweatm
t
security and stability.''In'such,
ii eontext, the inspktioia ryk
tem should W &%9&@
td' dkttfet m i j o ~ViqIattiok Thh'
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$or one thing, there is the implicit Western belief that
minimizing the inspection stand=& in this way makes
a p m e n t on first-step reductions more easily negotiable
with the''Soviet Union. This is a logical assumption to make;
the lw'thesystem demands,the easier the negotiations should
be, and the easier for the parties to accept what is required
of them. The trouble is that neither the record of the postwar negotiations nor the Soviet Union's assertions about
what it wants supports the hypothesis that that country
would accept inspection designed to fit the minimizing
rtandvvlr mare readily than the more demanding ins@'.I

,
I

of the second approach. In faa, the &wiq Uw~,m+&
wants neither- Instead it prdaaea ts want m@
ment immediately accompanied by
measures. Thus, despite the apparent 1
assumption, it has to be awed as unproven.
the Soviet leaden, and perhaps not even
they want or would accept when forced to
Secondly, the underlying asumption o
approach seems to be that the limits o
that will not undermine security and s
assessed and that minimal system ran be d
that these limits will not be txanrgrossed. P
But this is a static view of what may be required to
security and stability aed a h of the threats &at I&&&MM
of agreed arms limitations may p e . Neither wi& io, kg&
be unchanging. Thoge who take thc minimhi
to be sure, make their estimates comervativel
sizeable margins of error. Neverthelm, the cal
into account only those asumptiow as to the
of violation and the nee& of security and sta
can be made at the moment the calculations are made. Olb*
ously thb is an unavoida121~h a r d of dl p u o j ~ mof
future needs. But, the possibility that the arsuraptionr will
be prowd inadequate may suggest that systems
greater rather than lesser capacities. Of
assumptions may reduce rather than increase ths
made on inspection systems. But it will always be easier u)
discard or decide not to employ capabilities that
than
to agree on installation of new ones not previously mptea
A more elaborate inspection sywm seems, on the whok
more likely to respond to unanticipated requiremeats &an
one that is tailored to minimal standards at the o u ~ t .::
Thirdly*criteria ignored by the minimizing approrh' nu)r
in fact be important both to the creation and the ruoporrfrd
operation of a m control systems- Althwgh arms -tax4
has many important technical components, the bct thaa angia~
control will finally be .a political process &a~Zdnepraw-be
lost sight of. T h e minimalirt approach may be amrcct ia
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gtmmmma lPaill;tindi it politkdly .fearible
for inspection that

security and smble
umption, however, in
Mtes Congressional concern
eats h r the nuclear test ban.
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d&~%jagt,
f~ &b p w p , mattm-th'e condition fm Ornit&
S&.~~:a&eptitace an - arms- control agrrehenrt may well
&&:g~mment's
abilit)i to &ure the p p k that only
*light opportunities fof evasion will exist.
B&ar&pvw, if control systems are to work well and serve
is pl&tEmfrom.whioh to l~wnchmare
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discontent and that argues for
ntid minimum. However, the
is more likely to benefit from

*-dendcpedl on the availability to nations of a considerable

wmdG of deklnble and reassiring information.

T h e analysis has revealed another ternion beween, on
the oae hand, the apparent advanof atewive interacting
systerm to inspect intensively a range of arms regulations
and, on the other, the desirability of identifying individual
measures on which agreement on soon be reached. Emtunately, these two desiderata are not mutually exclusiw., If
the time dimension is introduced, it becomes psib3.f is
view the selection of individual measures with which . t~
begin the disarmament process as a prerequisite to the in&tution ~f the more elaborate systems.
A third tension has been revedled between the adv-ge~
ofimd in many circumstances by reciprocal inspection qb
tern and the aegotiating emphasis (unbreacbed except for
the Antarctic Treaty and the recent developments with re
spect to the test ban) on impartial inspection systems. To
insist that impartial systems are necessary in all
implies
that the satisfactory working of arms control systems a d
effective responses to violations depend on the crystallization
of a broad international consensus, rather than on the view
taken by the principal parties as to how their national interests m a y k saved. This paper has suggested that the latm
may be doser to reality thaq the former. Reciprocal system
deserve much more attention than has been given thm. :
No one who conscientiously essays to examine the tangled
skein of difiering, often contradictory, objectives, and technical and political considerations that are involved in the
inspection problem can easily e v e at any one organizing
or clarifying principle. T h e dilemma has surely aillicted the
pvmments which have had to devise policies to serve na
tional interests while taking account of the variety of factors
at play. Is there any policy problem on which government
policies have shifted more often than they have on m m
c o n ~ oin
l the postwar years? These shifts may be due to the
vagaries of policy-making, to the impact of changes in key
personnd, and to the shifting political requiremcntr ob governments as the environment, both domestic anti. intmational, changes with time. But it i s just as likely that the
wavering has been nothing more than an accurate rdkzti.01~
,

, +

the advantages of further testing anti .to accept -bpaction
arrangements which, however costly and technolagidy
plex, involve relatively little penewtion of so9ret&Sparr
]r1
of national fabrics, compared with the ir~spectiun:&ura;
at once more extensive and more intensive, calk&fcn:?any bf the first-titage disarmament plans. Ndftker W
nor the inspection should be unacceptable. Thi$Gow1d;bs
particularly m e if, as is possible, the ment test &es: hPve
approached exhausting the gains to be achieved by.funha
immediate testing. If neither side can gain much more
tests, neither $siderish a great deal in those limited oppbrtunities the other side may have for evading the pr-iptions. Over the l o w term, the risks might k saxadwhat
greater, but even t h a will remain limited if, as teems *to
be ,agreed, the only real opportunity for ension will lie in
smali, costly, underground tests.
. . .. .
No doubt the negotiations have been - complicated b y the
reluctance of the United States to agree to a system rwhichi.6~
instituting les~'than.the
best conceivable inspection gqmgez
mats,- seems to set a bad precedent for future .agreeonen@
in other spheres. T h e nuclear test ban is a pilot agrempqt
and ~h~ultd,
therefore, btablish a model for future a&tion. However, to state the problem this way does not mlve
the question of what principles determine whether a model
is a good one.
, .
., , - .:
One possibility is the.minimalist answer, or some.
of if, emphasizing the necessity for an inspection capabili.~
which, given the environment of strategic and other mlqtionships, provides assurance merely that national mq$q
and strategic !stabilitywill not be jeopardized. p a t sw&xyi
might be met by a test ban inspection system that did,'not
ensure ,against small underground tests. Or, it mi$&,
determined that the only good model would be a .sysiejq1&it
promised, through high-reliance inspection arraqgiq$p&,
ensure that obligations were being b~filled,Bnd thq=bg
reduced to a minimum opportunities for fearful ubcertaintjr
and friction. That decision might, incidentally, lead to tbe
conclusion that no test ban system is acceptable because hbnd
%

,

,?,'

fb

that has been considered promises to detect all possible violations. In any event, the system clearly does not have to be
impartial to be a good model for the future. A model should
be asked to meet only functional standards. A reciprocal system, if it met the needs of the test ban, would hardly be a
poor precedent for later systems that might or might not
call for impartial arrangements.
It is not necessarily true that if the great powers cannot
agree on this proposed limitation, there is no hope for other
measures to regulate arms. But the hopes for further progress
will surely recede if agreement on the test ban is not forthcoming soon. There can be no doubt that the test ban issue
is a significant measure of the governments' willingness and
ability to achieve the kinds of compromises, assuring that
the irreducible interests of all are protected, which will con:
front them at every stage of the disarmament process. Failurq
of the test ban negotiations would properly result in deep
gloom as to future prospects.
D
There is one hopeful lesson to be derived from the test
ban negotiations under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation '
Conkrence: the opportunity to expose powers not directl*
concerned in the test ban negotiationsMto the inspectiox$
issues has led to a considerable development of their aware4
ness of what is at stake. A key to progress in arms negotiation#
may well be the broad realization that slogans do not solve
disarmament problems. This might foreclose propagan&.
gains to the USSR and open the path to serious negotiation$
on the tough inspection issues among the parties principalljl
concerned. The Eighteen-Nation Conference has also rd<
vealed that the lesser powers are well aware that the maid
issues are those that directly concern the great powers. Thd
non-aligned participants have demonstrated that they wish: '
to help thk great powers to reach their own resolutions oi!
the issues between them, and also that such resolutions, i&
they can be reached, will be satisfactory to them.
MThese take lace in a suboomndttee comprising the United KingdomB
tbe USSR and
Unitd States.
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aialyisi and' tb
r&& simple condusions is not easy. However, the conclusion seems warranted that small steps must be taken before
larger ones. Whatever the Soviet Union may 8kjt about having greater first-stage ambitions, it is hard to credit it with
serious intent unless less demanding first-stage measures involving more limited inspection burdens prove aci*ptable to
it. T h e USSR has every reason to know that the world is not
ready for the hear foolproof inspection its first-stage proposals
. ' .
would require.
;. ti.
It may be a hopeful omen that, I - ring the 14&! .f$p,e@
Assembly, the USSR indicated it might depart fmm its
previous position. The suggestion that it would a h .q
retention of a "strictly limited and agreed n ~ m b e r ' of
'~
siles is encouraging and certainly deserves serious c " ~ @ q
tion. But this is a vcry limited concession to the p$ijiic&k
of stabilized deterrence, particularly since there is no kv&
dence of a Soviet shift with respect to aircraft on whi*
deterrence-still largely depends. Moreover, if the "sarjct'ly
limited" number is very small, the problem of inspsc*~
may be as great as those of inspecting a complete m b i tion, perhaps even greater.
One of the important tasks confronting the W ~ Mb+'&
convince the world that partial measures
beginning toward general and complete d
h a p when the Soviet Union ceases to gain p r q w d a
advantages from the promulgation of slogans, it , w a &d
that iai interests call for serious negotiation on l&nM
measures. ~h . ~ 3 ? 4
What of ' G P & s i o nbetween minimal and more ext-ive
inspection requirements? From what has preceded it ir cfkr
that inspection to confirm performance of obligatitms atld
to provide the greatest possible assurance that all oialdb~%
be detected is very desirable. On the other W d , &&-1o sum up ' tbe welght ok the
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iitple&dWiu
lac \txa&d, and inspection m m g e s ~ a ~ ~ t s
sacrifice ,someof the rcaaurarxc

that the world would

be a better place if the heavily unatd

* y+

powerg could r u w = w negQ~p
9 &$"p" ; %)Oi .
path of armi tedwtih:
,
,
. j-? j
In taking first steps, as in all later stiG-&
the +-Grin
compromisp will be neceuary. In tbc qa#pP
minimal agreemtmtr pqe to security
8
tolerable if the measuris that are negoti
account of the considerations sketched i p
of this paper. Saciifichg desirable m k i m
however, will inevitably pose other,
minimal agreements will leave great
standings, friction, public fears and alarm, and deterida~
tion of international relationships. If mipimall
&x
to work, governments will have to accept heavy'
ties to make the& work, and in some reapeas t!h
sibilities will approximate the conditions th
asked to meet under arrangements providing
illl
desirable kinds of irkpxtion. If the bre
by.hbttage agreMneqs is to be consolidated
govemmentr will have to behave in ways whi
other governments that the agreements are continuing to
serve mtional interat
< .
.p
'Major disarmament will become posible'only ar&&'L
lemir: has bem i k e d that governmeno whiih6
disarm have an interest in the greatest
mation about the disarmament proces
Rusk wg right when he said that '4~ecrecy
are fundamentally incompatible." If this
be art,imlated in fvotstage agreemarts on
it nevertheless will be unavoidable in the imp
of those agreements. In the end, it will have to
governments as they contemplate more far-reaching measures.
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